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The Indonesian military has played a significant socio-political role since 
the independence struggle against the Dutch. Subsequently, the military 
continued its socio-political intervention, influencing political decisions in the 
military, domestic and international arenas. Most scholars consider the New 
Order regime (1966-1998) to have been one dominated by the military. However, 
this thesis concludes that the level of the military's socio-political participation has 
been declining in recent years. It also aims to present some reasons for this 
decline. The analysis involved the examination of the levels and types of military 
prerogatives and contestations the military exercised against the civilian 
leadership, allowing for both objective and subjective analyses to be conducted. 
The analysis conducted demonstrated that the Indonesian military's socio-
political role had been eroded in recent years. Suharto's policies featured 
prominently as causes of this decline; but pressures from within the military, 
Indonesian society as well as international pressures also dictated a reduction in 
the military's socio-political role. This reduction will continue into the future, 
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The Indonesian military played a social and political role in the struggle for 
independence and through the years since then. During the armed struggle, the 
Indonesian military played the role of a "people's army," leading the population in 
the fighting against the former colonial masters. The success of this armed 
struggle strengthened Indonesians' beliefs that a successful military formation 
and strategy are predicated upon the common people's participation. Towards 
this end, the Indonesian military had to play an active role in the social and 
political affairs of the newly emerging state. Because they relied heavily on the 
support of the local population, the military was always careful to rally popular 
enthusiasm around their cause; this was the basis of the military's political role. 
This political role was never relinquished by the military even after independence. 
The socio-political role was formalized in 1957, and crystallized as the Dwi Fungsi 
or "Dual Functions" role in 1965-being a military force as well as a socio-political 
force. 
The military has continuously exercised its Dwi Fungsi roles in Indonesian 
society since the struggle for independence. However, the levels of its political 
influence have fluctuated through the years. This thesis presents the proposition 
that the Indonesian military's socio-political role has declined in recent 
xi 
years. A comparative method over time is used for this analysis, examining the 
levels of military contestation and prerogatives that the military has held over the 
civilian authorities. 
Analysis of events during the 1940s and 1950s ascertained that this period 
represented the formative years of the Indonesian military's political posture. 
Herein, the military exercised its prerogatives and contestations against civilian 
decisions affecting mainly military matters, for example, its leadership and 
structure. Even so, it had experienced failures in its contestation attempts. 
The Orde Lama or "Old Order" period (1959-1965) saw an expansion of 
the military's political influence. Significantly, the military began to interfere 
extensively in areas beyond military affairs. It successfully countered Sukarno's 
moves to sideline its influence, eliminated the PKI and eventually forced Sukarno 
out of office. Military initiatives also successfully shaped foreign affairs during 
Konfrontasi, Indonesia's armed campaign against the formation of Malaysia in the 
1960s. Its successes shaped the behavior of all political players, as civilian 
leaders subsequently had to factor in the military's potential reactions to political 
decisions. The frequency and scope of military prerogatives and contestations 
during Orde Lama thus illustrated a leap from those previously undertaken. 
Orde Baru or the "New Order'' period (1966-1998) saw a general decline of 
the military's influence in politics, although it continued to play an important role 
exercising its social roles at the lower levels of Indonesian society. Suharto's 
xii 
intimate knowledge of the military enabled him to exercise a relatively successful 
"checks-and-balances" strategy in containing the military's political role. His 
continued employment of loyalists in key positions ensured that he maintained 
effective control over the military. By the 1990s, he had rendered the military 
leadership basically impotent. 
As noted above, Suharto played a significant part in marginalizing the 
military's socio-political role. Suharto's own mandate in ensuring his rule and the 
prosperity of his family probably dictated the military's directions during Orde 
Baru. This state of events remained until the economic downturn in 1997 and 
1998, which unleashed a wave of discontent in Indonesia that Suharto could not 
suppress, ultimately leading to his resignation. This crisis also released the 
military from Suharto's grasp, allowing it to exercise its own initiatives in the post-
Suharto era. Until now, the military leadership apparently had decided to continue 
with the reduction of the institution's socio-political role, although it had 
emphasized that it would not consider a total elimination of these roles. Desires to 
reduce its political influence in the face of democracy, to regain legitimacy after its 
excesses in the past decades and to return to professionalism are the probable 
intra-military reasons prescribing its decision to reduce the socio-political role. In 
addition, societal demands as well as international pressure also forced the 
military's hand. 
An understanding of the circumstances leading to the crystallization and 
decline of the Indonesian military's socio-political role provides a better insight 
xiii 
into Indonesia's extremely dynamic political situation. The coming years will be 
crucial in the formation of Indonesia's new political landscape, and the military's 
initiatives in this area will have a definitive effect on these developments. Even 
with the implementation of more democratic reforms, the military will likely 
maintain a stake in the new system. This is to ensure the stability of the social 
and political situation domestically, as well as to safeguard its own interests. 
The Indonesian military will remain engaged in the socio-political arena in 
the near future. Without its mitigating influence, there is a possibility that 
Indonesia will revert to the chaotic times of the 1950s. Growth of the backward 
regions of the archipelago will also be severely hindered if the military does not 
participate in social programs in these areas. In the medium to long term, the 
situation may change with the maturing of the democratic movements and the 
establishment of non-military social organizations. Then, the military can 
concentrate its attention on developing a professional armed force befitting its 
size and influence in the Southeast Asian region. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the revolution for independence from Dutch colonial rule, the 
Indonesian military has played a social and political rote in the national arena. The 
failure to secure independence from the Dutch via diplomatic means forced the 
young military to take a more active role towards this end. During the armed 
struggle (1945-1949), the Indonesian military played the rote of a "people's army," 
leading the population in the fight against the former colonial masters. Even when 
the Dutch forces arrested the civilian teaders-Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta-
in December 1948, the military did not cease its attacks but instead redoubled its 
efforts, culminating in its attack on the city of Yogyakarta on 1 March 1949. This 
proved to be the turning point of the independence struggle, with both sides 
subsequently agreeing to resume negotiations that resulted in the formation of an 
independent Indonesia on 27 December 1949. 
The success of this armed struggle strengthened the Indonesians' belief 
that a successful military formation and strategy are predicated upon the common 
people's participation. This belief is reflected in the Indonesian military's basic 
military strategy Sishankamrata or "Total People's Defense System." Towards 
this end, the Indonesian military had to play an active rote in the social and 
political affairs of the newly emerging state. Because it relied heavily on the 
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support of the local population, the military was always concerned to rally popular 
enthusiasm around its cause. This formed the basis of the military's political role. 
The Indonesian military never relinquished this political role even after 
independence. Later, after the introduction of martial law in 1957, the army Chief-
of-Staff Major General Abdul Haris Nasution formulated the concept of the 
"Middle Way," whereby the military would neither seek to take over the 
government nor remain politically inactive. Instead, the military claimed the right 
to continuous representation in the legislature and government administration. 
The military further developed this "Middle Way'' concept into the doctrine of Dwi 
Fungsi or "Dual Functions" roles in 1965-the military being a military force as 
well as a socio-political force. 1 
In 1965, President Suharto emerged as the master manipulator of 
Indonesia's internal politics, at least until his downfall in May 1998. Throughout 
his rule, he maintained a credible "checks-and-balances" system to ensure that 
the different factions in Indonesia's domestic scene did not become powerful 
enough to challenge his r~le. Even though he was a former military general, 
Suharto did not spare the Armed Forces from his manipulations, often balancing 
them against the Muslim factions in the country. In addition, he exploited the "Dwi 
1 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), 24. 
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Fungsf' aspect of the military's roles to assist in his rule of Indonesia for the past 
30 years. However, this did not mean that the military was always subservient to 
politicians, even in Suharto's largely authoritarian rule. Throughout its history, the 
military has confronted politicians, struggling to tilt the balance between civil and 
military powers. However, it has appeared that the military's influence in civil 
affairs has waned in recent years. During his years in office, Suharto succeeded 
in reducing the military's formal representation in the political arena. In addition, 
there have been calls for the military to "return to the barracks" or to become a 
purely professional force. Even though the military played a part in the recent 
removal of Suharto as president, its profile appeared significantly lower when 
compared to the situation in 1965/66, when Suharto succeeded Sukamo. 
A. IMPORTANCE OF STUDY 
A decline in the socio-political functions of the Indonesian military will have 
an impact on Indonesian society, given the leading roles that the military played in 
previous decades. If the non-military roles continue to decline in the post-Suharto 
era, the future development of the Indonesian military as a professional armed 
force will also be affected. Therefore, it is pertinent to examine the reasons for, 
and direction and pace of this decline, so that one can predict future 
developments within the military and the Indonesian society. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Several research questions guide the direction of the thesis. The questions 
are used to determine the aims and the scope of the study. These are: 
a. How has the Indonesian military's socio-political role changed since 
1949, and especially in recent years? 
b. Did ex-President Suharto try to constrict the socio-political influence 
of the military? What other factors contributed to the rise and decline of these 
roles? 
c. What are the effects on Indonesian society and military as a result 
of the changes in the military's socio-political role? 
C. AIM OF THESIS 
The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the level of the military's 
socio-political participation has been declining in recent years. The thesis aims to 
present the likely causes of the decline, especially the extent to which ex-
President Suharto was responsible for lower levels of participation. It will also 
examine the effects that the military's socio-political participation have on 
Indonesian society and military. 
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D. SCOPE OF STUDY 
The thesis will cover the developments since 1949, when Indonesia 
achieved independence from the Dutch and when the Indonesian military began 
to play a legitimate and expanding role in the socio-political arena until mid-1998. 
The thesis will examine the social and political functions of the armed forces, with 
special emphasis on the political roles that have endured the most erosion in 
recent years. The thesis will also highlight the detriments and benefits arising 
from the changing nature of these roles, so that inferences can be drawn on the 
effects of further declines in the military's socio-political role. 
E. STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
This chapter is the introductory chapter. Chapter II will trace the origins of 
the military's socio-political role, and will present a historical account of the 
development and realization of these roles in Indonesian society. It will also 
evaluate the costs and benefits brought of the military's social and political 
involvement. 
Chapter Ill will address the decline of the military's socio-political 
influences in recent years. The level of participation of the military in the social 
and political arenas will be compared over time. Specifically, historical events in 
Indonesia in which the military has challenged the civilian politicians will be 
studied to determine both the type and intensity of these challenges. 
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Chapter IV will put forward some reasons for the decline of the military's 
socio-political role in Indonesian society. As Indonesia matures, one expects that 
the military would want to retreat to the background of the socio-political arena 
and allow civilians to take the lead in these areas, unless the civilians seriously 
threaten the military's basic ideals. In addition, Chapter IV will analyze the 
influence of President Suharto in determining the level of the military's socio-
political participation as well as the reasons why he marginalized the military in 
the political landscape over the last decade. Lastly, this chapter will address the 
impact of the reduced level of political and social participation by the military in 
both the military and within the Indonesian society. 
Chapter V will be the concluding chapter. It will present the findings of this 
study, and determine if the hypothesis presented in Chapter I is supported by 
existing data. In addition, it will speculate on the level of the military's socio-
political involvement in the near term, especially in the light of the removal of 
Suharto as president. 
F. METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
The analysis will use the comparative method over time to examine the 
involvement of the military in the social and political affairs. The method chosen 
to analyze the political influences of the Indonesian military is modeled after 
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Alfred Stepan's "Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, "2 an 
examination of the military politics in Latin America. This method analyzes the 
levels of military prerogatives and contestations employed by the military towards 
the civilian authorities. 
1. Military Prerogatives 
"Prerogative" is often seen as "a special privilege or power that one has or 
is allowed to have. "3 In his book, Stepan defined "military prerogative" as "those 
areas where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes it 
has an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control 
over its internal governance, to play a role within extra-military areas within the 
state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and political 
or civil society. "4 This definition will be followed in the analysis of the Indonesian 
military. Certain indicators ean be used as a guide to determine the level of 
military prerogatives, and they are reflected in Table 1. These are generic 
indicators modeled after the list from Stepan's book. 5 This thesis will use these 
indicators as guidelines in examining the levels of prerogatives exercised by the 
Indonesian military. 
2 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics : Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
3 Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary, 1991 ed., s.v. "Prerogative." (London: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 1991 ). 
4 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, 93. 
5 Ibid. I 94-97. 
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Table 1 
Indicators for Military Prerogatives. 
LEVEL OF MILITARY PREROGATIVES 
FACTORS Low Medium High 
1. Military's None. Yes. Military can 
political role legally take actions to 
defined in preserve law and 
Constitution. order within the 
country. 
2. Ability to None. Civilian leader Able to mobilize forces 
mobilize armed is the Commander- independently, even 
forces. in-Chief of the without civilian 
Armed Forces, and authorization. 
troops can only be 
mobilized by him. 
3. Active duty Normally none. Military's Military's participation 
participation in representation in areas other than 
Cabinet. limited to defense and security. 
professional areas, 
e.g., in defense 
and security. 
4. Active duty None. Institutionalized. 
participation in Assigned as local 
government. governors or civil 
leaders. 
5. Policing Police force under Police force is part of 
internal security. civilian authorities. the military. 
6. lntemal Controlled by Controlled by military. 
intelligence. civilians. 
7. Promotion of Determined and Determined by Determined and 
military officers approved by civilian military leadership, approved by military 
leadership. approved by leadership. 
civilian leadership. 
8. Military Civilian authorities Military determines Military determines 
Acquisition. able to significantly necessary and approves 
influence military acquisitions, acquisitions. 
acquisitions. conducted after 
civilian approval. 
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The above list is not exhaustive, as certain events that are examined will 
not fall within these indicators. In addition, the determination of the level of military 
prerogatives will largely be subjective, with the levels being determined relatively 
overtime. 
2. Military Contestation 
Another measure of the military's involvement in politics is examining the 
level of military contestation against the policies of the civilian democratic 
leadership. This is characterized by the extent to which there is intense dispute or 
substantial agreement between the military and the government concerning a 
number of key issues. For example, issues of potential conflict between the two 
institutions may concern military reaction toward the government's initiatives vis-
a-vis the organizational mission, structure and control of the military, and the 
military budget. 6 
The levels of military influence will largely be determined subjectively. One 
cannot merely count the number of military officers participating actively in 
political affairs to determine the levels, as the military is not always a 
homogenous entity but one riddled with factions that can be exploited by 
competent civilian politicians. 
6 Ibid., 68. 
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The Indonesian military has always played a significant role in politics. This 
thesis will use the analysis of the prerogatives and contestations to determine the 
level of political participation. By examining the levels through the years, we could 
determine the trend and prove the thesis that the Indonesian military's political 
role is declining. 
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II. ORIGINS OF THE MILITARY'S SOCIO-POLITICAL ROLE 
Prior to the Second World War, the Dutch colonial masters of Indonesia 
did not attempt to widely assimilate the indigenous population into the defense of 
the archipelago. The colonial army in Indonesia, the Koninklijk Nederlands -
lndische Leger (KNIL), was mainly officered by the Dutch and the Eurasians and 
very few Indonesians became officers, with the highest rank attained before 1940 
being a major. 7 While the Dutch recruited Indonesians as troops in the KNIL, 
most of them were from the Christian Indonesian areas of the eastem part of the 
archipelago. The Dutch also gave soldiers from these areas a substantially higher 
rate of pay than the relatively small number of Javanese, Sundanese, and other 
Indonesian soldiers in the KNIL. In addition, the Dutch officers also often 
highlighted the disadvantages of a Javanese dominated Indonesia to the 
Indonesian Christian soldiers. 8 Such Dutch attempts to fragment the indigenous 
Indonesians in the KNIL were largely successful. As such, one cannot consider 
the KNIL the cradle of the Indonesian military. 
7 Bilveer Singh, Dwi Fungsi ABRI: The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces 
(Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1995), 21. 
8 George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1959), 453. 
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It was only during the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies during 
the Second World War that the nucleus of the Indonesian armed forces was 
formed. In October 1943, the Japanese occupation forces in Java created PETA 
(Defenders of the Fatherland), an independent military force officered by 
Indonesians to assist the Japanese in repelling an Allied invasion of the 
archipelago. By the end of the war, PETA had some 37,000 men in arms in Java 
and 20,000 in Sumatra. However, its socio-political role was not formed at the 
inception of the armed forces. These roles developed later during the 
independence revolution against the Dutch. This chapter will examine the 
Indonesian military's socio-political role, and will present a historical account of 
the development and implementation of these roles in the Indonesian society. In 
addition, the detriments and benefits brought about by the military's social and 
political involvement will be examined at the end of this chapter. 
A. A MILITARY FORCE DURING AN INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE 
A military is a potent force. Its abilities to organize, train and lead in 
adverse conditions make it a valuable component in almost any struggle for 
independence; without the armed force support, the chances of success are 
drastically reduced. 
As an active participant in an independence struggle, the military will be 
involved in armed conflicts during the struggle. Regular military units often form 
the backbone in these conflicts, although most independence struggles also 
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involve the use of irregular units, comprising civilian militia forces or hastily 
trained civilian personnel in the fighting. In these instances, the regular military 
will normally take the lead in the armed struggles, bringing their expertise and 
equipment to the civilian population. Training and motivating the civilian 
population is crucial in developing a force capable of conducting armed struggles 
effectively. The military will also have to establish good relations with those under 
their charge, and this can be achieved by undertaking social projects. Thus, the 
military can play a significant social role in ensuring the success of the 
independence movement. 
In addition, the chaotic situation and the uprooted society often call upon 
the military to perform tasks above and beyond its war fighting duties. 
Recognizing its organizational abilities, the military often takes the lead or is 
asked to take the lead in organizing political activities in support of the struggle. 
Determining the goals for the struggle, negotiating with the other parties, and 
setting the direction of and pace of the struggle are often undertaken by the 
rt:1ilitary. Also, the military often has the final word in negotiations with the 
colonizers, or in determining the end of the independence struggle. Thus, a 
military's political roles often take root during the struggle for independence. 
The Indonesian military's socio-political role evolved along the above 
pattern, and were not designed at a particular point of time by a higher authority. 
Through this evolution, these roles became legitimatized and generally 
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accepted in the Indonesian society. The rest of this chapter will explore the 
evolution process of the military's socio-political role since the Second World 
War. 
B. THE INDONESIAN MILITARY IN THE INDEPENDENCE REVOLUTION 
The Indonesian independence revolution against the Dutch colonizers 
lasted from 1945 to 1949. In this struggle, politics and military actions were often 
closely intertwined. The youths who joined the revolutionary forces in the 
independence struggle were motivated less by the desire for a military career 
than by national patriotism. In addition, the nature that the struggle eventually 
took also underscored the military's concern for political matters. During the 
independence struggle, the Indonesian government had very little central control 
over the fighting forces. For example, the revolutionaries in the Outer Islands had 
minimal contact with Java. These forces drew their strategies and their recruits 
on the basis of local social pressures and alignments, and these did not 
correspond faithfully to the forces at work on Java.9 However, the mode of 
fighting against the Dutch remained essentially the same throughout the 
archipelago. Inferior in its training and armaments compared to the Dutch 
professional army, the Indonesian revolutionary forces conducted guerrilla 
warfare against the Dutch. This form of warfare drew heavily on support from the 
local population. The revolutionary forces acquired manpower and logistical 
9 Ruth McVey, ''The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army: Part 
1," Indonesia, no.11 (April}, 142. 
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requirements such as food and fuel from the civilians. In addition, the guerrilla 
fighters were organized along politically aligned units as well as regular army 
forces. The military leaders often had to perform political functions in order to rally 
these different political groups together and to obtain support for their 
independence cause. In many cases, the roles of the political and military leader 
became almost indistinguishable.10 
1. The Origins of the Socio-Political Role 
Professionally trained officers are normally not politically inclined, as the 
duties of protecting the state against armed threats are assumed to be beyond 
politics. However, this professional tradition was absent in the Indonesian officer 
cadre during the independence struggle. While there were some Dutch-trained 
professional officers who had joined the nationalist side, the majority of the 
officers were recruited from the quick mobilization necessary to build a large 
fighting force. This larger group of officers received military training in auxiliary 
military organizations set up by the Japanese during the occupation (especially 
PETA); many others had taken up arms in locallaskjar or irregular units formed 
spontaneously throughout the country in the months after the proclamation of 
independence on 17 August 1945.11 The latter two groups of officers did not 
share the same ethics as those professionally trained officers, especially 
10 Harold Crouch, Army and Politics, 25. 
11 Ibid., 25. 
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concerning the separation of politics and military. Thus, the absence of an 
apolitical military tradition made it easier for the officers to accept the political 
roles. 
The circumstances under which military officers acquired the political 
orientation during the revolution gave them a sense of having their own political 
purposes that could differ from those of the civilian politicians in the government. 
The military nature of the struggle had inevita.bly involved the army leadership in 
national politics, where their views often conflicted with those of the civilian 
government. The government leaders, who had joined the nationalist movement 
during the 1920s and 1930s, came mainly from the urban, Dutch-educated elite, 
whereas the senior officers of the army were rarely more than thirty years old and 
usually came from the small towns of Java. They had been steeped in traditional 
culture, obtained only secondary schooling, and learned little Dutch. The lack of 
rapport that derived in part from this generation and cultural gap was exacerbated 
by the feeling of army officers in the field that they had at least as much right as 
civilian politicians in the government to decide how the struggle was to be 
pursued. For example in 1945, the first army commander, Colonel Sudirman, was 
selected by an intra-army election rather than appointed by the civilian 
leadership. 12 Also, the army leaders often joined other political groups in 
expressing strong dissatisfaction with the government's readiness to offer 
12 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and 
Resistance, 1944-46 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972), 244. 
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concessions to the Dutch in the interests of a negotiated settlement. The leaders 
of the government had perceived the struggle in its broader view of diplomatic 
retreats; these were regarded as betrayals by guerrilla fighters, who were willing 
to risk their lives for nothing less than total victory. 
2. Early Manifestation of the Military's Political Role 
One instance where the civilian leaders were considered betrayers to the 
Indonesian cause was the acceptance of the Lingga~ati Agreement on 25 March 
1947. This agreement resulted in the de facto recognition by the Dutch of 
Indonesia's sovereignty over Java, Sumatra and Madura, but not over the entire 
republic. However, this agreement was seen as a violation of Indonesia's 
independence proclamation of 17 August 1945, which implied sovereignty over 
the whole territory of the Republic. 13 lhe Indonesian people disapproved this 
agreement, and demanded that the government make no concessions to the 
Dutch and only negotiate on the basis of 100 per cent merdeka (independence).14 
Here, Sudirman defied the civilian leadership and advised his soldiers to struggle 
on regardless. 15 
13 Soetjipto, H., Karamoy, W. A., Wuryani, M. S., et al., Indonesia 1995: An Official 
Handbook (Department of Information, Directorate of Foreign Information Services, Perum 
Percetakan Negara Rl, 1994); available from http://www.prica.org/indonesia/general/history.html, 
accessed on 15 June 1998. 
14 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 305. 
15 Anthony J.S. Reid, Indonesian National Revolution: 1945-50 (Hawthorn, Victoria: 
Longman Australia Pty Limited, 1974), 96. 
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Another example where the military opposed the civilian directions 
occurred in January 1948, when the civilian leaders signed the Renville 
Agreement with the Dutch. This occurred after the Dutch drove the republican 
forces out of Sumatra, eastern and western Java, confining them to the region of 
central Java around Yogyakarta. The agreement stipulated a cease-fire and 
stopped the Dutch from capturing Yogyakarta, in return for the Indonesian 
recognition of the "van Mook line,"16 and to withdraw republican forces from 
eastern and western Java. The military again felt betrayed and opposed this 
agreement. While some units followed the government's direction to withdraw, 
many units continued to occupy the easily defended guerrilla bases in Dutch-
occupied territories in defiance of the agreement. 17 
The alienation of army officers from the government reached its peak 
when the army fought on after the leaders of the government (Sukarno, Hatta and 
half of the cabinet) had allowed themselves to be surprised and captured by the 
Dutch in December 1948.18 Many army officers were suspicious of the new round 
of negotiations that commenced in 1949. They nearly rejected the cease-fire 
ordered by the government and felt cheated by the terms of the transfer of 
16 This line connected the points of the most extensive Dutch inroads into the 
Indonesian republic's territory. 
17 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 234. 
18 Ibid., 337-338. 
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sovereignty in December 1949. Thus, by the end of the evolution, many army 
officers had become deeply distrustful of the civilian politicians who had led the 
govemment. 19 
3. Post Revolution Developments 
After achieving independence in 1949, the military accepted civilian 
supremacy in ruling the country. However, the end of the revolutionary struggle 
did not mean a cessation of problems for the new republic. The political situation 
did not alleviate the tenuous situation at independence. Instead of adopting the 
1945 Constitution20 that was perceived to be advocating a strongly authoritative 
presidential regime, the civilian politicians adopted a more liberal democratic style 
of government. As such, a multi-party parliamentary system based on western 
political models was formed to win favor from the victorious Ailies. In addition, 
many modem-educated Indonesians had imbibed from their Dutch mentors the 
19 Crouch, Army and Politics, 27. 
20 The 1945 Constitution was developed by Sukamo and the Badan Penyelidik Usaha 
Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Body to investigate measures for the preparation of 
Indonesian Independence) or BPKI prior to the declaration of independence on 17 August 1945. 
It is influenced by Sukamo's Pancasila (Five Principles) ideology. 
Sukamo's Pancasila ideology was first expounded in a speech to BPKI on 1 June 
1945. It encompasses the following five principles: 
a. Belief in one and only God. 
b. Just and civilized humanity. 
c. The unity of Indonesia. 
d. Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of 
deliberations amongst representatives. 
e. Social justice for the whole of the people in Indonesia. 
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idea that parliamentary democracy was a sign of maturity as a modem state. 21 
But this style of governance proved highly unstable. Between 1950 to 1957, there 
were seven cabinets, each lasting about 15 months, and 1 oo political parties. As 
the civilian leadership became increasingly factionalized and ineffective in 
governing the nation, the Indonesian military became convinced that it bore the 
responsibility to intervene in order to "save· the nation. In this state of affairs, the 
conception of the army as an apolitical tool of the state quickly gave way to the 
older idea that the army was the guardian of the national interest and should 
intervene in political affairs whenever the weaknesses of civilian government 
made it necessary.22 
Events beginning from 1956 provided opportunities for the military to take 
a more prominent role in politics. The population deemed the Ali Sastroamidjojo 
government that was elected in 1956 as promoting only the interests of 
Javanese. This proved unpopular with those living outside Java, as they saw the 
government dominated by Javanese intent on "exploiting" the natural wealth of 
the export-producing areas. With the support of the local population, several 
regional and local commanders in Sumatra and Sulawesi took control of local 
governments in defiance of the central government. Factionalism within the army 
also added to the chaotic nature of the period. Of significance was the Lubis 
21 Ruth McVey, "Building Behemoth: Indonesian Constructions of the Nation-State," 
Making Indonesia, ed. Daniel S. Lev (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Southeast Asia 
Program, 1996), 18. 
22 Crouch, Army and Politics, 30. 
20 
Affair, which was a coup attempt by Colonel Zulkifli Lubis in 1956.23 This turbulent 
atmosphere prompted Sukamo (with the support of the military) to declare the 
abandonment of liberal democracy and proclaim a State of Emergency in April 
1957. The military exploited the situation and expanded its influence into the 
economic and political spheres.24 In 1959, Sukamo on the strong urging of the 
military re-instituted the 1945 Constitution. This provided Sukarno with substantial 
powers of the state. This period, which lasted until 1965, became known as the 
"Guided Democracy" phase. 
The military took full advantage of this period (1957-1965) not only to 
strengthen their political position but also to expand into the fields of general 
administration and economic management. From 1957 to 1963, Peperti or 
Supreme War Administration was established. This was an army hierarchy that 
paralleled civilian territorial administration down to the local level and was 
responsible for administering the martial law. It provided a regular means for 
military intervention in civilian affairs at all levels. In the early years of the martial 
law, decisions made· by Peperti were often more important than those taken by 
23 Lubis was a rival to the then Army Chief-of-staff, Major General Abdul Haris 
Nasution. When Nasution took steps to strengthen central army control over the regional army 
units, he and other officers whose posts were threatened and this prompted them to organize the 
coup attempt. As part of the coup demands, Lubis did not call for the removal of Sukamo but 
declared that the president could be forced to accept the dissolution of political parties and the 
establishment of a military junta. See Ruth McVey, "Post-Revolutionary Transformation: Part 1," 
157-171. 
24 McVey, ''The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army: Part II," 
Indonesia, no.13 (April), 147. 
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the civilian cabinet. 25 The most significant military representation in the 1959 
cabinet was General Nasution, who became the Minister of Defense in addition to 
his position as the leader of the army.26 At the regional level, the number of 
military officers appointed as provincial governors rose from 5 in 1960 to 12 out of 
24 in 1965, including key provinces as Jakarta, West Java, and East Java.27 
Military officers were also appointed as members of parliament at both the 
national and regional levels, and they were influential in the National Front set up 
by Sukarno to mobilize popular support for his political campaigns. The military's 
political involvement did not diminish when Sukarno lifted martial law in 1963 or 
when Sukarno once again introduced a modified martial law in 1964 during the 
Confrontation with Malaysia. 
4. Dwi Fungsi or "Dual Function" 
To maintain legitimacy for its non-military roles, the then Army Chief-of-
staff, Major General Nasution, formulated the concept of the "Middle Way" in 
1958. According to him, the Indonesian army would not follow the Western model 
as .a lifeless instrument in the hands of the government. On the other hand, it 
should not take over the government as this would only lead to coups and 
counter-coups as in the cases in Latin America. Instead the military 
25 Ibid., 151. 
26 Ibid., 150. 
ZT Harold Crouch, "Indonesia," Military-Civilian Relations in South East Asia, ed. 
Zakaria Haji Ahmad & Harold Crouch (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), 57. 
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should tread the "Middle Way;" participating in all areas of political and social life 
but not seeking to dominate the government. 28 It would claim the right to 
continuous representation in the government, legislature and administration. 
However, it is not until April 1965 that the military formalized this political role in 
its first seminar, when it produced the doctrine on the Indonesian Armed Forces' 
Dwi Fungsi or "Dual Functions." This "Dual Functions" doctrine stipulated that the 
military has two functions, as a "military force" and as a "socio-political force." As 
a "socio-political force," the military activities would cover "the ideological, 
political, social, economic, cultural and religious fields."29 
5. The Military and the Communists 
By the early 1960s, the military had emerged as a credible and potent 
force in Indonesia's political arena. Because of the earlier experiences of civilian 
leadership (during the revolution for independence), the military still had a deep 
distrust of civilian leadership. As such, President Sukamo had to turn towards 
other organizations in Indonesia to garner grassroots support. Particularly, he 
cultivated the Parlai Komunis lndonesia-PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). He 
recognized that the PKI was more able to mobilize mass support and more in fear 
of the army than the other parties, thereby making them the prime candidate for 
balancing against the power of the military. 
28 Ibid., 59. 
29 Crouch, Army and Politics, 24. 
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Politically, the military already regarded the PKI as their main long-term 
rival and wanted to limit its potential for growth. Protected by President Sukarno, 
the PKI was permitted to continue as a legal party despite strong anti-Communist 
sentiments in the military. PKI members held a substantial number of seats in the 
main representative bodies. However, the PKI was unable to make inroads into 
the executive positions of the cabinet. 30 Despite this, the communist party 
remained an effective check to the military's political powers. Its political clout 
expanded during Indonesia's conflict with the newly formed Malaysia-called 
Konfrontasi (Confrontation)-when it opted to take advantage of the sense of 
national invulnerability provided by the anti-Malaysian crusade to press its 
demands for greater influence in the government. It took a militant stance towards 
British and American interests in Indonesia, when PK/-Ied unions took over a 
number of their plantations and enterprises. In addition, Sukarno banned its most 
vocal civilian critic, the Murba Party31 in January 1965.32 The PKI appeared to 
have gained an upper hand in politics over the military when President Sukarno 
announced in August 1965 that Indonesia was fostering an anti-imperialist axis-
the Jakarta-Phnompenh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang axis. 33 
30 Ibid., 50. 
31 Murba Party was formed in 1948 by supporters of the "national-Communist" Tan 
Malaka. It was a rival party to the PKI. After the alignment of the PKI with the Chinese 
Communist Party in 1963, contacts were made between some elements in the Murba Party and 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with a view to the Murba replacing the PKI in 
international communist bodies such as the World Federation of Trade Unions. 
32 Crouch, Army and Politics, 66. 
33 Ibid., 67. 
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6. The 1965 "Coup" 
However, the PKI "supremacy" in politics over the military crashed in the 
aftermath of the abortive 1965 "coup." This "coup" was conducted by Gerakan 
Tiga-Puluh September:-G.30.S (Thirtieth of September Movement) on the night 
of 30 September/1 October, with the main actions taking place in Jakarta and 
Central Java. Technically, this was not a coup in the normal sense; there was no 
intention to bring down the government. Instead, according to the leader 
Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, the action was designed to forestall a planned coup 
on 5 October by a "Council of Generals" against the President. The members of 
G. 30. S seized and murdered six generals, including the army commander 
Lieutenant General Yani. 34 
Major General Suharto, then the commander of KOSTRAD (the Army's 
Strategic Reserve Command), was able to crush the coup. There are several 
theories with regard to the true perpetrators of this coup. Some hypothesize that 
the "coup" was planned and conducted by disgruntled factions within the army 
and not by the PKI. However, the official army version at that time conveniently 
linked the PKI to the coup, and subsequently took steps to eradicate the 
communist party as a political force. Army-sponsored actions throughout the 
country arrested and killed active members of PKI, while passive supporters were 
rounded up and sent to jails. While the army conducted most of these actions, the 
34 Ibid., 97-99. 
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military authorities also gave civilian anti-Communist organizations a fairly free 
hand in eliminating the communists. The total number of people killed in the 
aftermath of the coup remains unknown to date, with estimates ranging from 
250,000 to 1 million killed. 35 The aftermath of the coup did not augur well for 
Sukamo. With the elimination of the PKI as his key source of strength, he was 
powerless in stopping the military from becoming more entrenched in the 
Indonesian political scene. Nor could he prevent his own downfall in 1966. 
This landmark event signaled the end of the era of Guided Democracy. It 
also marked the demise of PKI and the rise of Major General Suharto and the 
military in the political world. Their rise to power was in accord with Nordlinger's 
theory that uthe military are often propelled into the political arena, and often 
remain there, when their countries are in the throes of violence arid governmental 
instability. "36 Already, many of the military officers had become experienced 
politicians, unlike officers of other military regimes that grabbed power from the 
civilian authorities through military coups. Two decades of political involvement 
had honed their political skills. They were adept at negotiating, bargaining and 
compromising-essential skills for successful politicians. Their involvement in 
non-military activities in the preceding two decades had shaped a political style 
more suited to the advancement of officers' interests within the existing structure 
35 Ibid., 155-157. 
36 Eric A Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States," American Political Science Review, 64:4, 1970, 1141. 
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than to the creation of an entirely new political order. Thus, when the military 
strengthened its grip on the government after the "coup," it did not suddenly 
become the bearer of new values and ideals but was more inclined towards the 
consolidation of power and the advancement of its existing interests. 37 
7. The Military in the New Order Period 
Between October 1965 and March 1966, Suharto successfully limited 
Sukarno's power while at the same time strengthening his own position within the 
army and the army's position in relation to the president. Under the pretext of 
ensuring stability and order in Indonesia after the "coup," Suharto gradually took 
control of the army. On 16 October 1965, Sukarno was forced to appoint Suharto 
as the commander of the army. At the same time, Sukarno's powers gradually 
withered away. This period represented perhaps the high point of military 
ascendancy over the civilian leadership, and will be examined in detail in Chapter 
Three of this thesis. It would suffice to say here that the military prevailed over 
the civilian authorities, forcing Sukamo to relinquish most of his powers to 
Suharto on 11 March 1966. This paved the way for Suharto to formally assume 
the Presidential post in March 1968, and Orde Baru or the "New Order" began in 
Indonesia. 
Unlike other military regimes, President Suharto did not adopt a 
bureaucratic-authoritarian form of government. Instead, he continued with the 
37 Crouch, Army and Politics, 35. 
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1945 Constitution (which suited his authoritative style of government) and re-
established Sukarno's Pancasila form of democracy in Indonesia, which differed 
significantly from the Western modes of democracy. First, his New Order 
Government decreed that all political organizations would adopt the State 
Ideology, Pancasila, as their sole organizing principle. In addition, he limited the 
number of political players to three parties-the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
(PPP) or "United Development Party", the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) or 
"Indonesian Democracy Party" and Golongan Karya (GOLKAR) or "Functional 
Groups."38 
By adopting the 1945 Constitution, Suharto automatically remained as the 
Supreme Commander of the armed forces. 39 However, he was also careful not to 
portray an overly militaristic appearance, perhaps to downplay the military nature 
of his government in international and domestic eyes. However, Suharto 
maintained the prominence of the Armed Forces in the society through its socio-
political role-he did not abolish the military's Dwi Fungsi concept postulated by 
General Nasution. He was careful to ensure that the military remained a minority 
38 The United Development Party is a fusion of the Moslem Scholars Party, the Moslem 
Party, the Islamic Confederation and the Islamic Union. 
The Indonesian Democratic Party is a fusion of the Nationalist Party, the Catholic 
Party, the Christian (Protestant) Party, the Indonesian Independence Party and the People's 
Party. 
GOLKAR represents personnel not affiliated with either party, namely civil servants, 
retired members of the Armed Forces, women's organizations, professional groups, farmers, 
students, etc. 
39 Article 1 0 of the 1945 Constitution: The President is the Supreme Commander of the 
Army, the Navy and the Air Force. 
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in the cabinet. Even so, they remained relatively more powerful than the civilian 
majority, having the political backing to exercise real power. While the military 
wielded substantial influence in politics, it also sought to associate civilians of 
various types with it, partly to draw on their skills and experience, and partly to 
create a favorable image among Western aid donors. In 1966, the military 
expanded its participation in the civil service. Military personnel headed eleven 
out of 20 departments concerned with civilian affairs; 23 out of 64 director-
generals were also military officers.40 The military was also automatically 
allocated seats in the People's Representatives Council (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat). Previously, 100 out of the 500 seats were assigned to the military, 
although this figure had declined to 75 in recent years.41 
The military was also dominant in regional administrations. In 1966, 12 out 
of the 24 provincial governors were military officers, including the important 
provinces of Jakarta, West Java and East Java. By 1968, this number rose to 16, 
and again increased to 22 out of the 26 in the 1971 elections. The military's 
political influence even reached to the lower levels of administration. By 1971, 
officers were appointed to about two-thirds of all the bupatis (district heads) and 
<40 Crouch, Army and Politics, 242. 
41 Komposisi & Daftar Nama Anggota MPR : Komposisi Keanggotaan. available at 
http:l/mpr.wasantara.net.idlkomposisi.htm, accessed on 25 September 1998. 
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mayor positions in lndonesia.42 The Indonesian military, through these political 
appointments, thus has a political influence in governing the various levels of the 
country. 
8. The Military's Social Roles 
The relationship between the Indonesian military, the state and society is 
best described by the military's basic military strategy. According to this strategy, 
the Indonesian people will rise up and fight with the military against any threat to 
the independence and sovereignty of the nation. It calls for the mobilization of the 
entire nation's potential and assets to create the capabilities required to defend 
the security of the nation. Formally, this system is called Sistem Pertahanan dan 
Keamanan Rakyat Semesta (in short Sishankamrata), or "People's Total Defense 
and Security." According to Indonesia's defense and security policy,43 the 
Indonesian military will lead the resistance. Supporting the military will be the 
population and national infrastructure, who will enforce public order, provide 
emergency services, guarantee public security, and organize popular resistance 
in the form of guerrilla warfare. 
This approach has shaped the roles the military has undertaken, its 
fighting strategies, ideals and expectations in relation to the state and the people. 
To succeed, this strategy demands close affiliation and cooperation between the 
42 Crouch, Military-Civilian Relations, 61. 
43 Indonesia's Defense and Security Policy, available at http://www.abri.mil.id/index5/ 
whitepre.htm, accessed on 19 June 1998. 
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military, the government and the general public. Here, the army's "territorial" 
organization44 serves well to develop this military-public rapport, with an army 
level of command corresponding to each of the functions of the civil government 
from the province right down to the village.45 
The military has to pursue a strong social role to achieve this rapport. As 
this duty is formally included as part of the Dwi Fungsi concept, the military can 
actively carry out social duties as part of its assigned tasks. These duties include 
the development of social infrastructures, and the improvement of the 
population's welfare. Through these social duties, the military has participated 
actively in nation building. The "territorial" organization of the army meant that the 
dispersion of forces throughout the country was necessary. This has contributed 
to the ease of carrying out social duties, as most of the army units are in position 
to assist the local government in developing the regions. 
44 The territorial organization of the army evolved over the years but gained momentum 
in the early 1960s as the army struggled to contain the growing influence of the PKI. 10 KODAMs 
or Military Area Commands are established in the archipelago, and each KODAM is further 
subdivided into KOREM (Military Region), KODIM (Military District) and KORAMIL (Military Sub-
district) in the territorial command structure. Using this structure, the army is able to reach out to 
the village level, as each KORAMIL commands an average of seven to eight villages. Territorial 
units are responsible for the defense and security of the areas under their control. Even though 
the personnel in these territorial units are not necessarily raised from the local population, their 
influence is widely felt as these units often undertake operations to develop geographic, 
demographic and sociologic resources to improve the lifestyles of the population. 
45 Bill Dalton, Indonesia Handbook, sttt ed. (Chico, California: Moon Publications Inc., 
1991}, 18. 
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C. CONSEQUENCES FROM THE SOCIO-POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT 
The socio-political role has been formally accepted in the Indonesian 
society since the independence struggle. Even so, the military has to continue 
conducting necessary actions to maintain its legitimacy. Some of these actions 
have benefited the Indonesian society, while others have stifled growth, 
especially in the political sectors. The following section will provide a short 
analysis on both the benefits and problems arising from the military's socio-
political role. 
1. Benefits 
a. ABRI Masuk Desa 
The Indonesian population has benefited from the active military 
socio-political involvement. One of the prime examples is the ABRI Masuk Desa 
or "Indonesian Armed Forces Entering the Villages" program. This has been very 
successful in developing the infrastructure and amenities of the relatively 
backward villages. Through this program, the military built roads, canals and 
other social infrastructures. In addition, the military sometimes provides health 
care to the population. The Indonesian Armed Forces have played the role of a 




Apart from the ABRI Masuk Desa program, the military also 
assisted the government in other social areas. For example, the navy provided 
transportation means for people and material in the national "transmigration" 
program. 46 Through these successful programs, the military was able to present 
the image of a "caring military" to the ordinary population. The interaction 
between the military and society has also remained very close, resulting in some 
cases in a good rapport being built between the population and the military. The 
military thus hopes to rely on the population in times of need. In fact, local 
intelligence on the society is partly provided by the population itself. 
c. Economic Success 
President Suharto had relied heavily on both the military's and 
technocrats' expertise to run the country and bring Indonesia out of the economic 
doldrums it had experienced since independence.47 To promote a healthy 
economic environment, he ensured that the Indonesian Armed Forces remained 
a professional fighting force capable of handling both internal and external 
threats. The degree of success can only be seen on the domestic front where the 
.ol6 This program aims to spread the concentration of people from the populated areas of 
Java and Sumatra to the other reaches of the archipelago. 
47 Robert Cribb and Colin Brown, Modern Indonesia: A History since 1945 {Singapore: 
Longman Singapore Publishers {Pte) Ltd, 1995), 115. 
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Armed Forces (of which the Police is a component) was largely successful in 
curbing internal social unrest. However, Westerners have often criticize its 
approach to curbing such unrest as being excessively repressive. Nevertheless, 
it was the military that had ensured social and political stability, albeit at a very 
high cost in the number of lives lost during the turbulent years since 
independence. This high cost had allowed Indonesia achieve the significant 
economic progress since 1967. 
2. Problems 
a. Political Repression 
By far, the greatest problem resulting from the military's intimate 
involvement in Indonesian politics is the repression of free speech and political 
activities. By limiting the number of political parties, President Suharto had 
effectively controlled the political directions and activities in Indonesia. In addition, 
the Armed Forces has been very effective in curbing political excesses under the 
general concern of ensuring stability within the country. In fact, critics of 
Indonesian politics contend that the Armed Forces were behind the ousting of Ms 
Megawati from the Chairmanship of the Indonesian Democratic Party before the 
last general elections. The restrictions appeared to have lifted somewhat in the 
recent ousting of Suharto as president. However, the continuing strong presence 
of the military in the political arena would still be an impediment towards complete 
political freedom and free speech. 
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Recent reports have also pointed out the certain members of 
KOPASSUS (Special Forces) were involved in the kidnapping of political activists 
during the May 1998 upheaval. 48 At the moment, the identities of the main 
perpetrators are not clear, nor is the issue of whether these actions were ordered 
by civilian leaders to suffocate dissident opposition or by the military as attempts 
to maintain domestic stability. In any case, this represents another military 
intervention in domestic politics. 
One cannot understate the importance of the military in politics. 
Without the tacit approval of the military, political changes cannot take place. For 
example, some reports stated that Suharto stepped down from the president post 
after the military had delivered an ultimatum that forced him to resign.49 General 
Wiranto also had to voice support for the current President, Habibie, before the 
latter could be credibly accepted in the society or by the military, which had long 
held him in great contempt. 
b. Corruption 
The strong political and social roles played by the military inevitably 
led to a deep involvement of the military in the economic sector. Many 
48 
"7 soldiers arrested for kidnappings," The Straits Times Interactive, available at 
http:llwww.asia1.eom.sg/straitstimes/ sea6_0715.htm, accessed on 15 July 1998; "Soldiers to be 
court-martialled," The Straits Times Interactive, available at http://www.asia1.eom.sg/straitstimes/ 
sea6_0716.htm, accessed on 16 July 1998. 
49 
"Did military tell Suharto to step down?" The Straits Times Interactive, available at 
http://www.asia1.eom.sg/straitstimes/ sea4_0523.htm, accessed on 23 May 1998. 
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businessmen sought their assistance in influencing events in their favor. 
Commanders and staff officers may be able to help the businessmen obtain 
contracts, licenses or permits to conduct particular commercial activities. They 
may also assist in resolving land disputes, calming labor disputes (often by 
strong-arm tactics), overcoming bureaucratic obstacles, relocating squatters and 
so on. Many businessmen, especially those of Chinese origin, find it prudent to 
keep the local military on side against the day when social unrest might threaten 
their lives or property. 5° However, such influences did not come free and financial 
remuneration was the order of the day. This led to widespread corruption in the 
military, and added to the cost of conducting business in Indonesia. Indonesia 
has the dubious distinction of being one of the most corrupt nations in Asia. In 
1997, the organization "Transparency International" ranked Indonesia as the 6th 
most corrupted country out of 85 countries surveyed. 51 
c. Limited Development of Social Organizations 
Suharto's regime often view non-governmental organizations with 
·suspicion, especially those with international links. As such, Suharto had used the 
military effectively to prevent the growth of such organizations. In addition, the 
military's superior organizational skills, extensive use of personnel and 
50 Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia (Sydney, Australia: Allen & Unwin 
Pty Ltd, 1996), 141. 
51 
''The Corruption Perceptions Index," Transparency International & Dr. Johann Graf 
Lambsdorff, 1997, available at http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/index.html, accessed 
on 24 September 1998. 
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widespread influence in Indonesia's social arena overshadowed any efforts by 
fledging social organizations. As a result, the perennial presence of the military in 
the social arena severely stunted the development of non-governmental social 
organizations. In the post-Suharto era, the country is effective denuded of 
indigenous non-governmental organizations that can lead and rally the people 
effectively, and this will complicate the internal situation if the military were to 
suddenly withdraw its participation in the social scene. 
The involvement of the Indonesian military in the social and political arena 
is historically rooted. This involvement has been legitimized by the military's 
actions in the independence struggle and by the formal Dwi Fungsi declaration. 
While this socio-political role had assisted in the development of Indonesia since 
independence, it had also stifled proper progress in certain sectors, particularly in 
the areas of free speech and true democracy. However, the military did not 
always play this role as freely as it could. Civilian leaders had made attempts to 
marginalize the military's influence in politics, some successfully, others not so. 
This ebb and flow and in. general a decline of the military's socio-political 
influences in recent years will be examined in the following chapter. 
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Ill. DECLINE OF THE MILITARY'S SOCIO-POLITICAL INFLUENCES 
A. THE CHANGING LEVELS OF THE MILITARY'S POLITICAL ROLE 
The preceding chapter described the formalization of the Indonesian 
military's socio-political role. In the military's view, its actions both prior to and 
immediately after the chaotic independence period justified and legitimized these 
extensive roles in the Indonesian society. However, not all sectors in the society 
accepted these roles. There were always attempts by the civilian elites to 
decrease these roles, to reduce the influences of the military and to limit the 
organization to its professional duties. 
This chapter will analyze the level of the military's socio-political influences 
in recent years. As detailed in Chapter I, the method to be used is a comparison 
over time of events that demonstrate the levels of military prerogatives and 
contestations-that will indicate the level of military influences in non-military 
affairs. Historical events in Indonesia in which the military had challenged the 
civilian politicians will be studied to determine both the type and intensity of these 
contestations. Analysis of these events demonstrates that the military enjoyed the 
highest political influence towards the end of Sukamo's rule in the 1960s, and that 
this level gradually diminished during Suharto's reign. The result of this analysis 
therefore goes against prevailing thoughts that the military greatly benefited from 
Suharto's rule and thereby expanding its domination of the Indonesian society. 
39 
B. BEGINNINGS OF MILITARY PREROGATIVES AND CONTESTATIONS 
1. Prerogative over Appointments 
During the independence struggle, different factions of the armed forces-
PET A, Laskjar and KNIL, 52 among others-were loosely bonded by the common 
goal of pejuangan (struggle). Local administrative chiefs controlled these forces, 
rather than the Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR or People's Security 
Organization), the government's organization for these revolutionary forces.53 In 
an attempt to exert central control over these forces, Sukamo in October 1945 
proclajmed the formation of Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR or People's Security 
Army), designed to amalgamate all the revolutionary forces under the control of 
the cabinet. TKR represented the first army high command of the Indonesian 
military, even though in reality this high command still had little influence and 
control over the regional forces. As it turned out, civilian control over TKR proved 
almost impossible. For example, military leaders rather than civilian leaders 
decided upon the appointment of Sudirman as Panglima Besar (loosely translated 
as "Commander-in-Chief') of the revolutionary forces in November 1945.54 
52 KNIL - Koninklijk Nederlands lndisch Leger, the Dutch-trained Indonesian army 
officers and men. 
53 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 103-104. 
54 Ibid., 232-244. 
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The military again exercised its prerogative in determining its leadership in 
June 1955. Then, the coalition government led by Partai Nasionallndonesia (PNI) 
or the Indonesian National Party appointed Colonel Bambang Utojo, a PNI-
sympathetic but relatively junior officer, as the army chief-of-staff. Officers of both 
the major factions joined to reject the appointment. As a result, the government 
was humiliated in that it could not control the military and soon fell from office. 
The fall of the Ali government produced an atmosphere of self-confidence in the 
army, and officers became convinced that they could have far more political 
influence in the future. 55 
The exercise of military prerogative in determining its own leadership 
would surface repeatedly throughout Indonesia's modem history. While not all the 
attempts were unsuccessful, the military nevertheless managed to intervene 
successfully in crucial times. 
2. Contestation over Organization 
The political leaders were eager to assert civilian control over the armed 
forces over fears that militarism or fascism would arise in Indonesia. The Sjahrif 
and Sjarifuddin cabinets (1945-1947) introduced a political commissar system into 
the army. This was primarily instituted through Staf PePolit (Political Education 
55 Crouch, Army and Politics, 31. 
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Staff) and Biro Pejuangan (the Struggle Bureau), established in the Ministry of 
Defense. The former aimed to indoctrinate and control the army and the latter 
was a coordinating body for guerrilla activities against the Dutch. The 
governments also backed revolutionary units that seemed more sympathetic to 
them rather than to the army high command. For example, they established 
/askjar {irregular) units to fight the Dutch to balance against the recalcitrant army 
high command. 56 These represented some of the first attempts that the civilian 
leadership undertook to control the military. 
The army high command quickly crushed these initial attempts by the 
Indonesian civilian leadership. The military was assisted by the conservative 
Hatta administration of 1948 that also endeavored to dismantle the leftist 
institutions established by the previous two regimes-the same institutions that 
had attempted to control the military. Hatta also forged an alliance with the 
military whereby the latter agreed to support government's policies in return for 
civilian non-interference in its affairs. As a result, the laskjar forces and army units 
deemed as disloyal to the central command were dismantled in the name of 
retrenchment and rationalization. 
56 McVey, "Post-Revolutionary Transformation: Part 1," 136. 
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The subsequent Madiun Affair of September 1948 further provided the 
military with a reason for advocating civilian non-intervention in its affairs. The 
Madiun Affair was an armed confrontation between the communists and the 
conservatives, where communist-influenced army personnel supported a coup 
attempt by the communists. Specifically, Brigade 29, formerly the Biro Pejuangan, 
captured and killed the leading pro-government officers in Madiun. 57 The high 
command claimed that the incident was a result of civilian influence within the 
military as it was the army institutions set up by the leftist Sjahrif and Sjarifuddin 
cabinets that instigated this incident. It gave the military leaders an excellent 
argument to use whenever, in subsequent years, political leaders again tried to 
engineer devices for civilian control of their forces. 58 
3. Failure of Military Contestation-The 17 October 1952 Affair 
Not all military contestations or prerogatives against civilian authorities 
were successful during this period. One instance was the 17 October 1952 Affair, 
which began with an attempt by the civilian leadership to determine the 
composition of the army high command. In particular, it demanded the dismissal 
of Ali Budiardjo (secretary general of the Ministry of Defense), Major General T.B. 
Simatupang (Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces) and Colonel A.H. Nasution 
(Army Commander). To the army high command, this represented the kind of 
civilian interference that the military could not overlook if it were to preserve the 
fiT Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, 142. 
58 McVey, "Post-Revolutionary Transformation: Part 1," 137. 
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autonomy essential to its role as guardian of national independence. To 
safeguard its position, the military together with some supporters surrounded the 
presidential palace on 17 October, where they then demanded the dissolution of 
the parliament. 
Sukarno at that moment agreed to the military's demands, but later 
reneged on his promises. He and the political parties set about working the 
destruction of the high command. He was successful in portraying the coup 
leaders as unpatriotic and therefore with no legitimate rights to their posts. 
Sukarno and his supporters were also able to sway elements within the military to 
conduct intra-military coups, removing commanders who had favored the army 
leadership. He removed Ali Budiardjo, Simatupang and Nasution, and dissolved 
Simatupang's former office of Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces,· thereby 
allowing civilians promote inter-service rivalry as an instrument of their control. 59 
The 17 October 1952 Affair thus represented a failure in military 
contestation with the civilian leadership. However, it did not characterize a 
downturn in the military's political fortunes. Valuable lessons learnt from this 
event helped shaped future military-civilian interactions. Particularly, Nasution, 
who would again come into power after 1955, realized that one should not 
59 See Simatupang's account of these affairs in T.B. Simatupang, Report from 
Banaran: Experiences during the People's War, trans. Benedict Anderson and Elizabeth Graves (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972). 
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confront Sukamo directly and that the army's cause was best served by pursuing 
its goals in such a way as to avoid a direct challenge. 60 
In summary, this period (from 1945 to the mid-1950s) is characterized by 
the initial attempts by the military to assert itself against civilian control. While 
some of the prerogatives and contestations that the military attempted were 
successful, others were less so. The disunity in the military also prevented it from 
adopting a higher political profile, as adept leaders like Sukamo could exploit the 
fractures within the military. In addition, the scope of most of these military's 
initiatives against civilian control was limited, directed towards the determination 
of the military organization and leadership and not against the political directions 
of the state. Thus, we can conclude that this period represented the initial growth 
phase of military's intervention in politics. 
C. PRIMACY OF THE MILITARY IN ORDE LAMA-SUKARNO'S ERA 
The defining moment for the military's deep involvement in the social and 
political arenas appeared to be in 1957. Specifically, the declaration of a State of 
Emergency in 1957 and the establishment of Peperti (Supreme War 
Administration, 1957-1963) provided the legitimacy for the military to rapidly 
expand its influence in all sectors of Indonesian society. The levels of military 
contestations and prerogatives did not diminish in the following years when 
Sukamo introduced his own brand of administration during the Guided 
60 McVey, "Post-Revolutionary Transformation: Part 1," 143-150. 
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Democracy years. Initially, Sukamo relied heavily on the military for support, but 
he was also well aware that a military strongly entrenched in politics would be a 
potent challenger to his rule. From 1959 to 1965, he sought to limit the military's 
political influence. In addition to exploiting rivalries within the military, he 
cultivated and obtained support from civilian groups to balance the powers of the 
military. The most important and most powerful of these groups was the 
communist PKI. Thus, the military in this period faced strong opposition in 
exercising its prerogatives and contestations against civilians. However, events 
demonstrated that the military successfully faced the civilian leadership in most 
cases, and ultimately culminated in removing of Sukamo from his presidential 
post in 1966. 
1. Improved Military Unity 
One of the reasons why the military was successful in pursuing its socio-
political goals in this period was that it had become more integrated and united 
after the Lubis Affair in 1956. Nasution (the Army Chief-of-Staff) was able to use 
this incident to remove many dissident officers in the army. He was further able to 
consolidate central control over military units after suppressing the 1958 
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rebellions, thereby improving the unity of the military. 51 The military thus became 
stronger as a result of these events, able to effectively assert itself against the 
civilian leadership. 
2. Appointments 
a. Political Representation 
One of the most direct and most visible political gains by the military 
was the appointment of General Nasution to the post of Menhankam (Minister of 
Defense and Security) in 1959. This was the first significant cabinet post headed 
by an active-duty military leader, as Nasution then still held the position of army 
commander. This marked the army leadership's establishment of a principle for 
which it had struggled from the very beginning of the revolution and which had 
previously been denied by Indonesia's civilian governments-direct 
representation in the political apparatus. 62 
Military representation throughout the country increased after 
Sukamo appointed Nasution to the cabinet post. At the regional level, the number 
61 After the failed coup attempt by Colonel Lubis, several regional and local 
commanders in Sumatra and Sulawesi took control of local governments and succeeded in 
rallying considerable popular support against the central government. By 1958, the crisis had 
turned into open rebellion, when the dissidents garnered civilian political support to set up the 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in West Sumatra. The military 
under Nasution was able to suppress this rebellion by playing off military factions within rebel 
commands and by presenting a prompt and credible show of central forces in the dissident 
areas. See McVey, "Post-Revolutionary Transformation: Part 1," 174-176; Crouch, Army and 
Politics, 33. 
62 McVey, "Post-Revolutionary Transformation: Part 1," 150-151. 
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of military officers appointed as provincial governors rose from 5 in 1960 to 12 out 
of 24 in 1965, including key provinces as Jakarta, West Java, and East Java.63 
Military officers were also appointed as members of parliament at both the 
national and regional levels, and they were influential in the National Front set up 
by Sukamo to mobilize popular support for his political campaigns. 
The military also sponsored a series of mass organizations to 
extend its political influence. This began with the "National Front for the Liberation 
of West Irian" in 1958. In addition, the military also broadened its political base by 
establishing Badan Kerjasama (Cooperative Bodies) with the aim of detaching 
from the declining conservative parties their affiliated peasant, worker, youth, 
woman and other organizations. This was important not only to protect the 
military from accusations of undemocratic behavior, but also to give the military a 
broader influence in the National Council. The military was only one functional 
group amongst many in the National Council, but by influencing the leadership of 
other functional groups, it could create for itself a significant block of support in 
the Council. 64 
b. Military Appointments 
The military had gained an important post in the cabinet, but it was 
not totally free from civilian supervision. Sukamo continuously attempted to 
63 Harold Crouch, Military-Civilian Relations, 57. 
64 Stephen Sloan, A Study in Political Violence: The Indonesian Experience (Chicago: 
Rand McNally & Company, 1971}, 79. 
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reduce the powers of the military and individuals within the military. For example, 
he was able to outmaneuver Nasution during the 1962 military leadership 
reshuffle and drastically reduced the latter's powers. In this episode, Sukarno 
offered Nasution the new post of Pangab (Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata or 
Commander-in-Chief, Armed Forces) with full authority over all four services 
provided Nasution relinquished his command over the army. Nasution probably 
agreed to be "promoted" so that the army could reassert its hegemony over the 
other services. The new post would also reinsure Nasution's position as 
Menhankam which he would continue to occupy after the 1962 leadership 
reshuffle. However, Sukamo apparently secured the support of Air Vice-Marshal 
Omar Dhani (Chief-of-Staff, Air Force) and Police General Sukamo Joyonegoro 
(Chief-of-Staff, Police), who protested on behalf of their services against being 
commanded by an army officer. As a result, Sukamo was able to exploit this and 
altered Nasution's planned promotion to the largely administrative post of Kasab 
(Kepala Staf Angkatan Bersenjata or Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces).65 
Sukamo had hoped that such a move would remove Nasution from 
immediate control of the army and supply an alternate focus for military loyalties. 
Sukamo had also expected that there would be dissension in the army with the 
promotion of Achmad Yani as the army commander. Yani was a relatively junior 
general and Sukamo had hoped that he might be weak enough in his new office 
65 C.L.M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography 
(St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1985), 156-157. 
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to remain dependent on Presidential support. However, Yani proved to be 
sufficiently adept at army politics to overcome much of the resentment at his 
premature promotion. He was also aware of the disadvantages of breaking with 
the Nasution camp. As such, while Yani assumed a more cooperative public 
stance towards the civilian leadership, he essentially remained opposed to 
Sukamo's camp. 66 In a sense, then, the military was able to limit Sukamo's 
attempts to control the military. 
c. Sukamo ~ Reorganization of Koti 
Sukamo moved swiftly to contain the military at the end of martial 
Jaw in 1963. He reorganized the military's operational commands by dissolving 
Peperti (Supreme War Administration) while retaining Koti (Komando Operasi 
Tertinggi or Supreme Operations Command), which was also formed during the 
martial law to prevent Nasution's Defense Ministry from gaining its powers. 
Sukamo also ensured that the army did not dominate the new Koti-army officers 
headed only two of the five divisions. He appointed the foreign minister, 
Subandrio, to be in charge of intelligence; the minister of information, Achmadi, 
became responsible for "mobilization;" and Air Commodore Sri Muljono 
Herlambang headed the division of operations. With broad and general functions, 
Koti became more important than the cabinet. The main cabinet ministers, 
66 McVey, "Post-Revolutionary Transformation: Part II," 152-153. 
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including Nasution, became members of its Advisory Council, and many important 
government decisions were taken at its sessions. 
It would appear that Sukamo had some successes at reducing the 
military's ability to conduct political prerogatives and contestations against 
civilians. However, it was more likely that the military allowed Sukamo's 
advances. Under Achmad Yani, the army was prepared to cooperate with the 
president, but its cooperation was dependent on Sukamo not adversely affecting 
the balance of power. As long as the army could preserve its basic interests and 
PKI did not make significant advances politically, the army leadership was willing 
to tolerate minor changes that did not reduce its position as the most powerful 
organized force.67 While Sukamo could challenge and outmaneuver the military, 
he nevertheless could not forge an army leadership subservient to him. 
3. Military Control over its Budget 
Another area of contestation between the military and the civilian 
authorities was the control over the military budget. The first opportunity for the 
military to partly control its own budget came in late 1957 when nationalist 
demonstrators seized all Dutch-owned enterprises in Indonesia following an 
adverse vote on West Irian in the United Nations. The military immediately used 
its martial law powers to place all Dutch enterprises under military supervision, 
tJT Crouch, Army and Politics, 55. 
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and its involvement remained even after the nationalization of these enterprises. 58 
It appointed officers to managerial and supervisory posts in government 
enterprises, and this provided the institution with substantial sources of funding 
outside the regular government budget. 
The Cold War also provided an additional boost that strengthened the 
military's control over their own budget. Indonesia was able to obtain aid from 
both the United States and the Soviet Union as these two superpowers courted 
Indonesia. Particularly, the Soviet Union provided substantial aid to Indonesia, 
and transferred a large amount of heavy equipment-modern ships and 
airplanes-to the military.69 These opportunities thus enabled the military to 
reduce civilian control over its budget, thereby providing an avenue for the 
military to demonstrate a high level of contestation with civilians when required. 
4. The Military and its Influence on PKJ's Development 
Sukamo began to cultivate the PKI in 1960 as a counterbalance to the 
military's growing political strength. He felt that the communist organization would 
provide him with the grassroots support for his rule. The military on the other 
hand regarded the PKI as their main long-term rival and wanted to limit its 
68 Ibid., 38-39. 
69 McVey, "Post-Revolutionary Transformation: Part II," 157. 
52 
potential for growth. However, Sukamo was able to neutralize some of the 
military's attempts to marginalize the PKI, although he was aware of the depth of 
anti-Communist sentiment generally prevalent in the military. Protected by the 
president and contained by the military, the PKI soon became a key factor in the 
Indonesian balance of power. Sukamo allowed the PKI to remain as a legal 
political party, and its members subsequently held a substantial share of seats in 
the main representative bodies. He accorded its leaders, Aidit and M.H. Lukman, 
ministerial status as deputy chairmen of Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
Sementara (Provisional People's Consultative Assembly) and Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Gotong Royong (Mutual Assistance People's Representative Council) 
respectively, but the PKI continued to be excluded from cabinet posts holding 
executive powers. 70 
Here, the military exhibited a high level of contestation in civilian politics. 
Even with the substantial communist support, Sukamo was still not able to 
elevate PKI to a higher political presence for fear of military opposition. The 
potential of the military to interfere in politics had thus placed some limitations and 
inhibitions to the natural development of politics in Indonesia since the 1960s. 
7° Crouch, Army and Politics, 48-51. 
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5. Konfrontasi 
The military's attitude towards the pursuance of Konfrontasi 
("Confrontation") against Malaysia71 denoted the deepening level of military 
contestation against the civilian relationship. The military leaders were 
unenthusiastic, especially Nasution and Achmad Yani. However, they continued 
to follow Sukamo's instructions in conducting low-level infiltration and conflicts as 
long as the conflict did not escalate into a real war. In fact, they viewed this as a 
good opportunity to strengthen the military's political position as well as gain new 
armaments and equipment. But they began to undermine Sukamo's policies 
when he decided to escalate the conflict in 1964 to an invasion of Malaysia. 
a. Koga and Kolaga 
The military leadership saw the establishment of Koga (Komando 
Siaga or Vigilance Command, the body responsible for controlling the operations 
against Malaysia) as a move to reduce their capacity to restrain the military side 
of the campaign. The commander of the air force, Air Marshal Omar Dhani, 
headed Koga. The army considered him to be a Sukamo loyalist and therefore 
could not be relied upon to abide by the military's inclinations during Konfrontasi. 
71 Malaysia's decision to incorporate Sabah and Sarawak (in present East Malaysia) 
into the Federation was not accepted by Indonesia. A decision was taken by both countries to 
request a United Nations mission to ascertain the wishes of the people in those areas. Following 
only brief hearings with local politicians, the UN mission concluded that the "majority" wanted to join Malaysia. These conclusions were immediately denounced by Indonesia. Taking the view 
that Malaysia was a "British project" designed to create a "puppet state" to perpetuate 
neocolonialism, Indonesia launched Konfrontasi, a campaign that began with low-scale 
incursions into both Malaysia and Singapore. 
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As such, the military was compelled to conduct a subtle contestation against 
Sukarno to redress the situation. The army leadership persuaded Sukamo to 
accept a military reorganization of the fighting forces into the Kolaga (Komando 
Mandala Siaga or Mandala Vigilance Command) structure, 72 so that the military 
leaders, instead of Sukarno and his trusted officers, could exercise a larger 
controlling influence over the operations. 
The army leadership also selected Brigadier General Kemal ldris to 
head the invasion forces in Sumatra. ldris was a long-time opponent of Sukarno 
and his decision to conduct the Konfrontasi operation, and the army leaders were 
confident that he would not conduct any invasion of Malaysia without the army's 
consent. The military also took various steps to forestall Sukarno's invasion 
attempts. Firstly, ldris was able to delay the transfer of invasion troops to 
Sumatra. In addition, the army planners for the invasion ensured that the 
preparations did not reach an advanced stage by not supplying the means of 
crossing the straits. These deliberate attempts ensured that the invasion of 
Malaysia remained just a plan. 73 
72 Koga was replaced by Kolaga. This Mandala concept meant that the Kolaga had 
authority over all troops from all four services within the area of its command but no authority 
outside the area. For Konfrontasi, Kolaga had authority over Sumatra and Kalimantan but not 
over Java. The explicit limitation of the authority meant that it could not mobilize troops from Java 
but had to request forces from the service commanders. See Crouch, Army and Politics, 71. 
73 Crouch, Army and Politics, 72-73. 
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b. Military Prerogatives on Command Appointments 
While the military leadership could not prevent Sukamo from 
appointing Air Marshal Omar Dhani as the head of Koga, it was able to influence 
other key appointments. The appointment of Brigadier General Kemal ldris was 
instrumental in the military's plans to hinder Sukamo's execution of the 
Konfrontasi campaign. Even the appointment of Brigadier General Supardjo, a 
leftist officer completely committed to the president, to head the forces in 
Kalimantan was negated by the military's choice of the lower echelon 
commanders. The interregional commander for Kalimantan, Major General 
Maraden Panggabean, and the West Kalimantan commander, Brigadier General 
Ryacudu, were army loyalists. The army was also able to replace the left-leaning 
East Kalimantan commander, Brigadier General Suharjo, with Brigadier General 
Sumitro. 74 Here, the military again demonstrated a high level of prerogative in 
shaping appointments changes that would serve their interests. 
c. Military's Contestation in Foreign Affairs 
Sukamo's decision to land infiltrators in West Malaysia on 17 
August and again on 2 September 1964 greatly disturbed the military leadership. 
It decided to develop secret contacts with the Malaysian and English leaders to 
inform them that the (Indonesian) army was not supporting the expansion of the 
conflict. By doing so, the Indonesian military hoped to reduce the risks of the 
74 Ibid. I 73. 
56 
confrontation campaign while continuing to go through the motions of supporting 
it. 75 Achmad Yani was a prime mover for initiating these contacts, and he was 
able to prevent the conflict from being escalated to a full scale war. 76 This 
decision to bypass civilian authorities in contacting the Malaysian leaders 
represented a high level of military contestation against Sukamo, for this effort 
seriously undermined the entire Konfrontasi campaign. 
The military in Orde Lama did not co,nfine its attention to military affairs 
only. Militarily, it was able to achieve some success in determining its military 
leadership and organizational changes, and even able to obtain a certain degree 
of control over its budget during this period. Far more significant were the 
military's attempts to exercise its prerogatives and contestations beyond the 
military boundaries. The military's active participation in politics began in this 
period with the appointment of Nasution as the Menhankam, and the formal 
appointment of other active officers to governmental and regional civilian posts. In 
addition, civilian leaders began to factor in the military's potential reactions when 
9eciding the political landscape of Indonesia. However, the Konfrontasi campaign 
probably demonstrated that the Indonesian military had matured into a credible 
and effective domestic political instrument. Konfrontasi demonstrated that the 
75 Ibid., 74-75. 
76 Julius Pour, Benny Moerdani: Profil Prajurit Negarawan (Jakarta: Yayasan 
Kejuangan Panglima Besar Sudirman, 1993), 317-320. 
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military was not subservient to Sukarno's politics. Instead, it had illustrated the 
military's willingness and capabilities to contest civilian political decisions when 
they diverged from the military's interests. While the military leaders were not able 
to reject the president's policies openly, they nevertheless successfully 
undermined the civilian authorities throughout the campaign. Such a level of 
prerogatives and contestations represented a leap from the non-military roles the 
military had undertaken between 1945 and 1957. 
D. THE PEAK OF MILITARY CONTESTATION 
. The 1965 "coup" marked another landmark in the development of the 
military's socio-political role. The military exploited this incident to strengthen its 
political position vis-a-vis the other two parties in the power balance--Sukarno 
and the PKI. Here, the military probably exercised its highest levels of 
prerogatives and contestations against the civilian leadership. Two key army 
officers shaped the military's responses-Nasution and Suharto. They were the 
most senior officers in the army remaining after the coup, and they took a more 
belligerent stance towards Sukarno and the PKI compared to the previous Yani 
administration. 
1. Military Prerogative in Leadership Changes 
The military under Suharto demonstrated a high level of prerogative 
immediately after the "coup" on 1 October 1965. As Yani, the army commander 
was missing, Suharto took the independent decision to assume the leadership of 
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the army. The senior generals in Jakarta who could be contacted agreed to 
Suharto's initiative. In addition, he assumed control over the naval and police 
forces in Jakarta. 77 Here, Suharto did not rely on civilian consent to legitimize his 
appointment as head of the army, but depended on the support of the military to 
sanction his actions. 
The army leadership further contested the decisions of the civilian 
leadership in the aftermath of the "coup." In a direct confrontation with the 
president, Suharto and Nasution refused to recognize Sukamo's appointment of 
Major General Pranoto Reksosamudro as the army commander. Their refusal 
forced Sukamo to compromise; Sukamo (in his capacity as Supreme 
Commander) took formal command of the army while appointing Pranoto to carry 
out the "daily tasks" of the commander, but only on the condition that Sukamo 
gave Suharto the responsibility for the "restoration of security and order."78 In 
addition, Suharto refused to abide by Sukamo's appeals to limit the retribution to 
those directly involved, resulting in the killings of thousands of PKI supporters 
and the elimination of the PKI as a political party. 
The military also demonstrated a high degree of prerogative in pressuring 
Sukamo on the issue of leadership changes within the military. Consequently, 
n Crouch, Army and Politics, 130. 
78 Ibid., 137. 
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Sukamo bowed to pressure and appointed Suharto as the army commander and 
chief-of-staff of Koti on 16 October. The military leadership under Suharto also 
forced him to dismiss the air force commander, Omar Dhani. 79 
2. Military Prerogative in Organizational Initiatives 
The military's prerogatives and contestations against civilian authority 
intensified when Suharto established Kopkamtib (Komando Operasi Permulihan 
Keamanan dan Ketertiban or Operations Command to Restore Order and 
Security) on 1 0 October to institutionalize the authority granted by Sukamo. 
Kopkamtib allowed Suharto to have operational control and command of military 
resources to conduct the security operations, providing him the de facto powers 
of the army commander.80 
Suharto further consolidated his powers by reorganizing Koti in late 
November. He removed the two civilians heads-Subandrio and Achmadi-and 
Air Vice Marshal Sri Muljono as he considered them to be Sukamo's loyalists. By 
doing so, he removed all vestiges of Sukamo's control of this organization. 81 
Suharto was also successful in establishing Mahmillub (Mahkamah Militer Luar 
Biasa or Special Military Court) to try leading prisoners from the 1 October coup. 
He also assumed the liberty to appoint the judges in such courts and to determine 
79 Ibid., 161. 
80 Ibid, 160-161. 
81 Ibid., 161. 
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who would be brought to trial. 82 Suharto's successes demonstrated a high level of 
military prerogative in deciding organizational establishments and changes. 
3. Military Prerogative in Eliminating the PKI 
Sukarno's refusal to publicly announce the dissolution and the banning of 
the PKI brought him into conflict with the military. Again, the military demonstrated 
a high level of contestation against Sukamo when the West Java commander, 
Major-General Ibrahim Adjie unilaterally "dissolved" the PKI in his area on 17 
November 1965. Regional commanders throughout the nation followed his 
actions, even though no civilian directions were given to pursue such initiatives. 83 
The subsequent massacre of the PKI supporters, conducted mainly by civilian 
anti-Communist organizations, decimated its ranks and eradicated it as a political 
party. Some estimates put the number of PKI supporters killed at 1 million. Here, 
the in-action on the part of the military in not preventing the massacre proved to 
be crucial in the eradication of the PKI, its main political rival. Thus, through both 
actions and non-actions, the military had successfully contested and changed 
Indonesia's political environment. 
4. The Disguised Coup of 11 March 1966 
Despite the high level of military prerogatives and contestations against 
Sukarno in the beginning of 1966, the military still avoided ousting Sukamo from 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid., 163. 
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the presidential post and assuming direct political power. This would allow the 
military escape from the charge of destroying the nation-state's symbol of 
legitimacy that had for so long been vested in Sukamo. As one observer noted, 
"To ensure the long-term legitimization of the decimation of a political rival, the 
army needed the sanction of Indonesia's foremost national figure and sole 
charismatic personality, President Sukamo. "84 
The unwillingness of the military to move decisively against the president 
perhaps provided Sukamo with the impression that he could still control the 
military. This emboldened Sukamo to initiate a series of moves designed to 
reassert his authority-reducing the powers of Koti, calling for the physical 
formation of Barisan Sukamo,85 and demanding the release of thousands of PKI 
supporters. The president's offensive against the military culminated in the 
announcement of a cabinet reshuffle on 21 February 1966.86 Sukarno dismissed 
Menhankam Nasution and nine other cabinet members. In their places, Sukarno 
appointed his supporters as well as PKI sympathizers. 
Sukamo's intransigent attitude towards the military, his refusal to accept its 
expanding roles in politics and his attempts to marginalize the military completely 
84 Sloan, A Study in Political Violence, 78. 
85 In January 1966, faced with army-backed student demonstrations, Sukamo called for 
his supporters to form barisans (ranks) to defend him. This idea was subsequently picked up by 
the first deputy prime minister, Subandrio, who appealed in a radio speech for the formation of a 
Barisan Sukamo. See Crouch, Army and Politics, 167. 
86 Crouch, Army and Politics, 173-17 4. 
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alienated the organization. The cabinet reshuffle, a clear attempt to deprive the 
military an independent voice in Indonesian politics, proved to be the principal 
factor in forcing the military to act against Sukamo. The military decided to adopt 
more drastic and explicit measures against the president, although it still did not 
envisage a military coup to seize power from the civilian leadership. One of these 
measures was the demand for the removal of certain ministers from the cabinet. 
Not surprising, Sukamo promptly disregarded this demand. Another measure was 
to create social unrest that would force the president to tum towards the military 
for assistance, thereby providing a leverage for the military. As such, the military 
encouraged students to create an atmosphere of anarchy in the capital and 
student demonstrations broke out on 23 February. The demonstrations grew in 
scale, and the police were powerless to act as army forces protected the 
demonstrators. A decision was also taken to arrest a number of the ministers, 
although this was not carried out. The contestation culminated on 11 March 1966, 
when soldiers "took up positions in front of the palace" where a full cabinet 
meeting was in progress. Alarmed with the growing anarchical situation in the 
capital, and at the boldness of Suharto and the military, Sukamo had no choice 
but to hand most of the powers to Suharto. He signed a "letter'' empowering 
Suharto, as the army commander, to take all steps deemed necessary to 
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guarantee security, tranquillity and stability of the state.87 In June that year, the 
military again showed its prerogative in calling for a session of the MPRS (Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara or Provisional People's Consultative 
Assembly) to obtain constitutional endorsement of Sukamo's "Letter of 11 
March."88 
The military also interfered in determining the leadership of the other major 
political parties. It forced PNI (Partai Nasionallndonesia or Indonesian National 
Party) to hold a congress in April 1966, and blatantly forced Ali Sastroamidjojo, 
the Sukamoist general chairman and his supporters of out of office, replacing 
them with an army-supported cadre.89 
Events immediately before, during and after the 1965 coup clearly 
demonstrated the maturity and the intensity of military contestations and 
prerogatives against the civilian leadership. With Suharto and Nasution at the 
helm, the army-the premier service in the Indonesian armed forces-eliminated 
the PKI as a political organization and eventually forced Sukamo out of office. 
The effects of these prerogatives and contestations were significant, affecting 
developments not only in the military but also in Indonesia's society. The previous 
87 This "letter'' later became known as Super Semar (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret) or 
"Letter of 11 March." The circumstances under which Sukamo signed this "letter'' remained 
unclear, though it is likely that he was under severe duress as a result of the situation in Jakarta 
and the belligerent attitude of the military towards him. For a comprehensive account of this 
event, see Crouch, ArmyandPolitics,179-196. 
88 Crouch, Army and Politics, 201. 
89 Ibid. 
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multipolar political environment-with Sukamo, PKI and the military playing active 
roles-essentially disappeared and the military emerged as the principal political 
player in Indonesian society. The success of the military thus changed 
Indonesia's political landscape. 
E. SUHARTO'S ORDE BARU 
The military continued to influence the development of civilian political 
machines during Suharto's Orde Baro ("New Order''). These efforts were however 
driven by Suharto, and not truly autonomous attempts to contest civilian authority. 
By the 1980s, the military appeared to have lost some of its usefulness to 
Suharto. The military was in a sense a victim of its own success, as it had 
effectively denuded the Indonesian political scene of all effective opposition to 
Suharto's rule. In addition, in the wake of the oil crisis in early 1980s, Suharto 
began to rely more on civilian expertise in his government to provide professional 
advice to his government. His ties with the military institution thus became more 
tenuous, and some degree of military contestations against him surfaced. Here, 
the definition of military contestations and prerogatives becomes nebulous. 
Suharto was a military general, and technically, any military initiatives against him 
cannot be considered as military contestations against the civilian leadership. 
However, this thesis sees President Suharto as more "civilianized" as he did not 
champion the military's cause constantly, but in fact took initiatives to contain the 
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military so as to safeguard his powers. As such, military initiatives against 
President Suharto are considered as military contestations and prerogatives 
against the civilian leadership. 
Nevertheless, these contestation attempts were not of the scale and scope 
of those against the civilian leaders of Orde Lama. It was not simply because the 
military was reluctant to oppose one of its former generals. Rather, it was the 
skills of Suharto that had prevent such contestations. Suharto's success in 
manipulating the military in the struggle against Sukarno had provided him an 
intricate knowledge of the power-play within the military. He knew that a united 
military would be an unstoppable force in Indonesia, able to dictate directions to 
all parties within the state. Such a united military had served him well in 
challenging Sukamo and the civilians for power. However, in the absence of a 
viable civilian threat, it could prove to be an insurmountable obstacle to his plans. 
He still needed the military's support, but he could not allow the latter to become 
overly powerful politically. Suharto's initiatives against the military, and the few 
. military contestations against Suharto will be examined in this section to 
demonstrate the declining military's political roles. 
1. The Military's Roles in Consolidating Suharto's Power 
Suharto's attention was on consolidating his power in the political arena 
during his early years as president. The military continued to play a crucial role in 
assisting Suharto towards this end. The security apparatus Kopkamtib was 
transformed to become the government's main instrument of political control. Its 
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functions increased from handling the PKI problem to dealing with a wide range of 
civilian dissidents, including students and Muslim demonstrators. In addition, 
newspapers required Kopkamtib's permission to publish, and on many occasions 
Kopkamtib withdrew their permits. In 1971, Suharto entrusted Kopkamtib with the 
maintenance of "security and order" during the election campaign and made 
many arrests to achieve this purpose. 90 
Another instrument that Suharto used extensively to maintain political 
control over his rivals was Bakin (Badan Koordinasi lntelijens Negara or State 
Intelligence Coordinating Body). The military controlled this organization which 
was responsible for keeping watch over internal developments in the political 
parties and the Chinese community as well as being alert for signs of a 
Communist revival. 91 This apparatus became very effective in limiting the growth 
of democracy in Indonesia, and was often looked upon as the Gestapo or KGB of 
Indonesia. Thus, while not playing the independent role as in the pre-1965 period, 
the military continued to have a significant influence on Indonesia's political 
atmosphere. 
In recent years, the military played a notable role in assisting Suharto 
subdue the threat posed by Megawati, daughter of former president Sukarno. 
90 Ibid., 223. 
91 Ibid. 
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First, the military attempted to influence the PO/ (Partai Oemokrasi Indonesia or 
Indonesian Democratic Party) congress meeting in 1993 by pressuring PDI 
delegates not to elect Megawati as chairperson. Here, the military's attempts 
were unsuccessful as the congress elected Megawati to that post. The resultant 
Megawati-led PO/ represented an unprecedented challenge to the government. 
Suharto probably feared that if Megawati and the PO/ were left unchecked, they 
could pose a serious threat to his re-election plans in 1998. To prevent this, 
Suharto used both civilian and military means to remove Megawati as POl leader. 
Personnel from the Interior ministry and the military used intimidation, coercion 
and bribery to split the PO/ and to ensure that an extraordinary party congress 
was held in June 1996 to determine the POfs leadership. To prevent negative 
reports on the governmental intervention during this POl congress, the Military 
Information Chief Brigadier-General Amir Syarifudin called in the chief editors of 
major national newspapers and news magazines and instructed them to report 
the conflict in a manner sympathetic to Megawati's opponents and the 
government and not endanger Indonesia's political stability. Between June 20 and 
22 the congress proceeded without disruption. Troops heavily guarded the 
congress site in Medan. Senior officials like Mendagri (Menteri Oalam Negeri or 
Interior Affairs Minister) Yogie S. M. and Pangab General Feisal Tanjung 
addressed the delegates. As expected, there was an unanimous vote to remove 
Megawati and replace her with former POl leader Soe~adi, considered to be a 
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more pliable figure. 92 Thus, the military continued to be an essential tool in 
quelling Suharto's political challengers. As such, Suharto could not afford to 
completely alienate the military in his attempts at controlling the institution. 
2. Accommodating the Military 
Suharto was aware that being a military general at the helm of Indonesia 
did not mean that the military would support him in all his policies throughout the 
years. He therefore had to maintain a delicate balance between accommodating 
and controlling the military. Suharto continued to sanction the military's Dwi 
Fungsi concept. The military continued to have representation in the cabinet, the 
government and in all levels of the society. In addition, Suharto did not clamp 
down on the military for pursuing economic interests or seeking unofficial financial 
aid from businessmen. On the other hand, he endeavored to control the military 
through various means to prevent its development again into an institution that 
could seriously threaten or curb his rule. 
3. Controlling the Military 
a. Military Appointments 
By effectively exercising his powers as Supreme Commander of the 
military, Suharto was able to significantly influence the appointment of officers to 
92 Ed Aspinall, "What happened before the riots?" Inside Indonesia (Edition No 48: 
October-December 1996) available at http://serve.com/inside/edit48/ed.htm, accessed on 9 
August 98. 
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senior positions both within and outside the military. Rather than a hierarchical 
chain of command typical of military administration, Suharto fostered a more 
arbitrary system based on personal loyalty, which allowed relatively junior or 
"obscure" officers to assume senior positions. 93 Suharto rewarded officers who 
demonstrated loyalty, while shunting off others who were critical of him or 
threatening his hold on power. For example, Suharto did not bring back Nasution 
into the government during the formation of his first cabinet in 1966. Nasution 
could be a significant threat to Suharto's rule as he had widespread support 
within the military. 
Suharto also became adept in marginalizing dissident officers, not 
sparing even his closest subordinates. One example was General Benny 
Murdani, who until 1988 was one of Suharto's most trusted and powerful aides. 
Up to and including his stint as Pangab from 1983 to 1988, Murdani remained 
fiercely loyal to Suharto and was openly dismissive of retired generals who 
criticized the president from the sidelines. However, he lost Suharto's trust when 
he broached with Suharto. the subject of his (Suharto's) family's business 
activities and objected to Sudharmono's vice-presidency. Suharto did not accept 
his criticisms, although in retrospect those criticisms were valid and contributed to 
his downfall in 1998. As a result, Suharto removed Murdani from the powerful 
Pangab post to be Menhankam, a largely administrative post, in March 1988. 
93 Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, Development and 
Pressure for Change (london: Routledge, 1993), 77. 
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Five years later, Suharto dropped Murdani from his cabinet altogether. Suharto 
also ordered the dismantling of the powerful intelligence agency BAIS (Badan 
lntelijen Strategik or Strategic Intelligence Agency) in 1994. This agency was 
Murdani's principal power base, and remained his strongest link to the military 
after 1988.94 By sidelining even one of his closest aides, Suharto demonstrated 
that he would not tolerate any dissent within the military. He also proved that he 
had the prerogative to effect personnel changes at the highest levels. The 
inability of the military as an institution to contest Suharto's actions illustrated the 
waning political powers that it held during this period. 
In recent years, the trend of appointing "loyal" officers to premier 
positions became clearer. For example, many of his former aides-de-camp 
(ADCs) had risen to prominent positions within the military. These included 
Pangab General Wiranto, Kasad (Chief-of-Staff, Indonesian Army) General 
Subagyo Hadisiswoyo, Kassospol (Chief-of-Staff, Socio-political Affairs) 
Lieutenant-General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and former Kasal (Chief-of-Staff, 
. Indonesian Navy) Vice-Admiral Arief Kusharyadi. 
Suharto had also appointed some of his close relatives to prime 
positions within the military. General Wismoyo Arismunandar, his brother-in-law, 
once held the post of Kasad. He elevated his son-in-law, Lieutenant-General 
Prabowo Subianto, rapidly through the ranks of the army, granting him important 
94 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1994), 284-285. 
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positions such as the commander of Kopassus (Special Forces Command) and 
commander of Kostrad (Army's Strategic Reserve Command) until being 
sidetracked following the downfall of Suharto. 
Another method that Suharto utilized to keep the military in check 
was to appoint less charismatic officers to lead the forces. These included former 
Pangab and present Menko Polkam (Coordinating Minister for Security and 
Political Affairs) General Feisal Tanjung and former Kasad General Hartono. 
These officers did not have strong grassroots support within the military, thereby 
ensuring that they would not be able to mount strong challenges against 
Suharto's rule. 
Throughout the 1990s, Suharto interfered extensively in determining 
the top military leadership. Apart from General Edi Sudradjat, who once held the 
three top military posts- Menhankam, Pangab and Kasad-briefly in 1993, the 
other generals who had held these posts were considered to be Suharto's 
loyalists. Suharto largely determined their appointments, and this aptly 
demonstrated the low military prerogative in deciding military appointments. 
b. Political Appointments 
Suharto had also ensured that the military remained a minority in his 
cabinets. In fact, the number of cabinet positions occupied by the military has 
decreased gradually through the years. In 1983, it held 13 out of the 32 cabinet 
positions. In 1988, this figure had dropped to 11 out of 38 positions and it further 
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slid in 1993, with the military occupying 10 out of the 41 cabinet positions. In 
addition, these 10 officers have considerably less clout than their cabinet-level 
counterparts in the 1980s simply because the military had become less able to 
formulate and disseminate its own political opinions. 95 Rather, it had become 
more subservient to Suharto and had been transformed into a mere executioner 
of Suharto's political directions. 
Suharto also reduced the number of officers in the legislative DPR 
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or People's Representative Council) in recent years. 
Prior to 1993, the military was allocated 1 00 out of the 500 DPR seats. However, 
in 1993, this was reduced to 75 seats. 96 The military was unable to resist this 
move, primarily because of the deferen~ial nature of its leadership towards 
Suharto. Here, the military demonstrated a low level of military contestation 
against the political master, Suharto. 
c. Exploiting the Military's Disunity 
Over the last five decades, different factions have existed in the 
Indonesian military. Suharto exploited this factionalism in his attempts at 
controlling the military. By allowing such factions to exist, Suharto ensured that 
the military's attention was focused on its internal problems and not on his rule. In 
addition, he used the rivalries among the different factions to eliminate opponents 
95 Ibid., 284. 
96 Komposisi & Daftar Nama Anggota MPR: Komposisi Keanggotaan, available at 
http://mpr.wasantara.net.idlkomposisi.htm, accessed on 25 September 1998. 
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of his policies. One prime example was the Malari (Malapetaka Januari or 
January Disaster) Incident in 1974, when General Ali Murtopo, one of Suharto's 
most trusted officers, succeeded in ousting the faction led by General Sumitro, a 
critic of Suharto's policies. After this incident, officers understood that personal 
loyalty to Suharto counted a great deal more than institutional clout. 97 
Another method that Suharto utilized to reduce the military's ability 
to contest his policies was by constantly pitting the generals against each other. 
This was facilitated by the creation of intelligence bodies that, besides their stated 
internal security role, investigated the military's sentiments. Suharto ensured the 
loyalty of these bodies by employing his trusted generals like Ali Murtopo, Yoga 
Sugama and Benny Murdani as heads of these bodies through the years. These 
bodies were able to weave an intelligence network so intricate that the officer 
corps was mistrustful of one another and incapable of uniting against him. 98 
97 By 1974, disillusionment among some of Suharto's military supporters was on the 
rise. Contrary to popular belief, corruption was not a central priority of the government and in fact 
became institutionalized within the military. Suharto's top two advisors, Ali Murtopo and Sudjono 
Humardhani, were considered to be the leaders of these ''financial generals." (Schwarz, 35) 
These ''financial generals" were considered to be bringing the army into disrepute and detracting 
from efforts to modernize the armed forces. As such, a group of "professional soldiers" looked 
towards General Sumitro (head of Kopkamtip) to oppose them. Sumitro employed his 
considerable powers to stir up student protests, prompting mass demonstrations and the burning 
of cars during a visit by Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in January 197 4. The result was a 
triumph for the ''financial generals," as Sumitro was blamed for inciting the students. He and his 
supporters were relieved from their posts. See Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, 33-35; Vatikiotis, 
Indonesian Politics Under Suharto, 75. 
98 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto, 76. 
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4. Suharto's Cultivation of Islamic Faction 
Murdani's criticisms of Suharto and his family probably showed Suharto 
that he could not totally rely on close military subordinates to follow his policies 
blindly. Thus, in addition to employing "divide and rule" tactics in the military as a 
means of control, Suharto began to tum to other organizations as a balancing 
force to the military's influence-a tactic used by Sukamo in the early 1960s. 
Suharto exploited the military's suspicions of Islamic fundamentalists when he 
turned towards the Muslims to play this role in the early 1990s. He was certain 
that the military would not join forces with any large Islamic organizations but 
would in fact contain it. Suharto allowed and even strongly sponsored the 
formation of ICMI (lkatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian 
Association of Muslim Intellectuals) in 1990, headed by then Menristek (Minister 
for Research and Technology) B.J. Habibie. This organization includes among its 
membership critical non-governmental Muslim leaders and long-serving cabinet 
members. ICMI was set up as a sounding board for Muslim input into public 
policy, supported by its own think-tank, the Center for Information and 
Development Studies, and even had its own newspaper, Republika, to help 
formulate and broadcast Muslim views. 
The military's weak leadership did not successfully oppose the formation of 
ICMI, despite its traditional suspicion of Islamic organizations. Again, this 
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demonstrated the inability of the military to counter civilian initiatives, another 
indication of the low level of military contestation it could exercise in Suharto's 
era. 
5. Military Acquisitions 
The military did not always have total autonomy in determining its 
acquisition plans during Orde Baru. Civilians sometimes determined military 
hardware purchases, and these decisions did not necessarily conform with 
military requirements. One example was the acquisition of aircraft in 1993. The 
Indonesian Air Force wanted fighter aircraft like the F-16s to augment its air 
defense, and ground-attack aircraft like the Hawk 100/200. However, the 
government's subsequent decision was to acquire 24 Hawk 1 00/200 aircraft. This 
decision was attributed to the influence exerted by former Menristek (and now 
president) B.J. Habibie. As Menristek, Habibie had his own agenda in that he 
wanted to raise the technological levels of IPTN (lndustri Pesawat Terbang 
Nusantara or National Aircraft Industry). In this case, British Aerospace was 
willing to transfer technological knowledge as part of the deal. In addition, Habibie 
secured the licence to manufacture Hawk 1 00/200 parts for sale back to British 
Aerospace. These represented lucrative commercial and technological 
advantages for Habibie and IPTN. Using his strong personal relationship with 
Suharto, Habibie was able to bypass the Air Force's requirements and persuaded 
Suharto to acquire the Hawk 1 00/200 aircraft. 
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Another example where civilians were able to determine military 
acquisitions was the purchase of 39 ex-East German warships in 1992.99 
Apparently, only Suharto and Habibie were involved in the decision to acquire 
these ships.100 Habibie clearly did not consult the Indonesian Navy in the 
acquisition process; it did not even have the required infrastructure to 
accommodate these ships or manpower to crew the ships. Nor did the navy want 
these ships as they had bad experiences with Soviet designed and manufactured 
hardware in the 1960s. However, Habibie was able to convince Suharto that this 
was a good buy-the total cost of the 39 ships was about US$120 million. Again, 
Habibie had his own agenda for promoting this purchase. PT PAL shipyard, an 
important component of his strategic defense industries, stood to benefit from this 
acquisition. This shipyard would be involved in the refitting, customizing and 
acclimatizing of these ships for use in the tropics. 
The purchases of the Hawk 100/200 attack aircraft and the 39 ex-East 
German ships are the only significant capital equipment purchases by the military 
in the 1990s. Habibie, who had a close relationship with Suharto, heavily 
influenced both of these acquisitions. While this had not occur frequently, it 
nevertheless shows the vulnerability of the military to civilian initiatives during 
99 These are 16 Parchim class corvettes, nine Kondor class minesweepers and 14 
Frosch class landing ships. 
100 Lowry, Armed Forces of Indonesia, 98. 
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Suharto's era. One can consider the level of military prerogative in determining 
military acquisition to be low in recent times. 
6. Successful Military Prerogative Against Suharto 
One of the successful military prerogative against Suharto was in the 
choice of the Vice-President in the 1993 elections. The military pre-empted 
Suharto in nominating Pangab General Try Sutrisno as their choice of vice-
president in 1993 even though Suharto had yet to make his wishes known. The 
other MPR (Majelis Perrnusyawaratan Rakyat or People's Consultative 
Assembly) factions quickly backed the military choice. As such, the military forced 
Suharto to accept Sutrisno, as he did not want to be seen rejecting the stated 
views of the MPR that is constitutionally responsible for selecting the nation's top 
leaders. Since then, Suharto has taken steps to prevent such an occurrence. He 
dropped two leading military politicians, Menhankam Murdani and Mendagri 
(Interior Affairs Minister) General Rudini, from his 1993 cabinet. In addition, 
several officers close to Murdani like then-Kassospol Harsudiono Hartas and 
Teddy Rusdy, a top aide to Sutrisno, were unexpectedly overlooked for cabinet 
jobs in 1993. This probably was Suharto's response to the military officers 
presumptuous enough to restrict his latitude in choosing a vice-president. 101 
Thus, while the military successfully exercised their prerogatives against Suharto, 
Suharto was still able to retaliate against the military's initiative in other ways. 
101 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, 286. 
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F. 1998 • THE FALL OF SUHARTO 
1. Military Involvement in Suharto's Resignation 
The extent of military involvement in shaping the recent events in 
Indonesia that led to the 21 May 1998 downfall of Suharto remains unclear. Some 
reports painted an impression that the military was unable to influence events. 
For example, in mid-May, Pangab General Wiranto refused to back a call by 
Parliament Speaker Harmoko for Suharto to resign, saying that it had no basis in 
law.102 However, this did not appear to have much effect as Suharto was forced 
to relinquish his leadership to Vice-President Habibie, another indication of the 
low military influence in politics. Other reports indicated that it was an ultimatum 
from the military that forced Suharto to resign as President.103 If so, the military 
would have demonstrated a high level of contestation against Suharto. In any 
case, the military still wielded an influence over the national leadership issue, and 
various reports have indicated that the military's consent was a crucial factor in 
allowing key leadership changes-Habibie assuming presidency and Akbar 
Tandjung assuming chairmanship of Go/kar. 
102 
"Suharto resign call 'illegal'," The Straits Times Interactive, available at 
http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitstimes/sea1_0519.htm, accessed on 19 May 1998. 
103 
"Did military tell Suharto to step down?" The Straits Times Interactive, available at 
http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitstimes/sea4_0523.htm, accessed on 23 May 1998. 
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2. Kopassus Involvement in the May 1998 Riots 
Recent reports have indicated that some Kopassus members under the 
orders of lieutenant-Generals Prabowo and Muchdi were involved in the 
kidnappings of political activists and the shooting of protesters during the May 
1998 turmoil in Indonesia. This represented a clear attempt to influence the 
political situation then, although the aims of these initiatives are debatable. It is 
possible that Prabowo was creating a situation in which he, as the Kostrad 
commander, would be able to engineer a coup attempt against Pangab Wiranto, 
or even against Suharto. Alternatively, he could be under the instructions from 
Suharto to intimidate his political opposition. The military leadership and the 
institution probably did not orchestrate these kidnappings and shootings, rather, 
these unfortunate actions were masterminded by one individual officer--
Prabowo. This appeared to be the position advocated by Pangab General 
Wiranto to absolve the military institution (and himself) of these acts. As such, 
this event may not be indicative of the level of military's prerogative against 
civilians. 
3. Initiative to Reduce the Military's Political Influence 
There had been several indications that the military would limit it political 
interventions in the post-Suharto era. Kassospol Lieutenant-General Bambang 
Yudhoyono stated in June 1998 that "the idea of ABRI (Indonesian Armed 
Forces) now is to readjust its role, to build a new political role-sharing." One such 
response, he said, would require the armed forces to begin pulling back from their 
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traditional "dual function" involvement in politics, influencing society indirectly 
instead of directly. 104 President Habibie in his Independence Day speech on 15 
August 1998 echoed the same sentiments. He called for a new bottom-up 
approach in readjusting the military's social-political roles, and to move away from 
the security approach-using security forces-to ensure stability in lndonesia.105 
This was further affirmed by Pangab!Menhankam General Wiranto, when 
he announced on 21 August 1998 that the military would adopt new principles in 
redefining Dwi Fungsi. These principles included "political role-sharing with non-
military partners" and ending its policy of "occupying" troubled territories. 
However, he also mentioned that the military did not intend to relinquish its social-
political role, although it would no longer attempt to dominate political life in the 
new reform era. The military still saw itself as the national savior, and would in the 
short term continue to ensure that Indonesia "recover from the economic crisis, 
engage in and control the reformation process, to guarantee the continuity of 
development. "106 
It is unlikely that Habibie will be able to dictate any changes to the military's 
socio-political role as he did not have a strong political base and in fact had to 
104 Lieutenant-General Bambang Yudhoyono, quoted in "Abri will ease out of political 
role" The Straits Times Interactive, available at http://www.asia1.eom.sg/straitstimes/ 
sea4_0622.htm, accessed on 22 June 1998. 
105 
"Indonesia 'in an era of democratic resurgence'," The Straits Times Interactive, 
available at http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitstimes/sea1_0816.htm, accessed on 16 August 1998. 
106 
"Wiranto outlines new roles for the armed forces," The Straits Times Interactive, 
available at http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitstimes/sea1_0822.htm, accessed on 22 August 1998. 
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rely on the military to support his initiatives. It is therefore more likely that the 
military exercised its prerogative in initiating this review of its Dwi Fungsi roles. 
The reasons for such a move are still unclear; perhaps the military foresaw that a 
reduced military presence in the political arena is a pre-requisite for the 
democratization of Indonesia, and as such, is taking the necessary steps to 
gracefully reduce its involvement in Indonesian politics. Or perhaps the military is 
trying to recover its prestige as the leader of Indonesian society after its excesses 
during Suharto's Orde Baru-its heavy-handed suppression of separatist 
problems in Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya-and especially its poor handling of 
the riots in May and June of 1998. 
G. SUMMARY 
The military has continuously exercised its Dwi Fungsi roles in the 
Indonesian society since the struggle for independence. However, the above 
analysis has determined that the levels of its political influence have fluctuated 
through the years. The 1940s and 1950s represented the formative years of the 
military's political posture. This period saw the military exercising its prerogatives 
and contestations against civilian decisions affecting mainly military matters, for 
example, its leadership and structure. Even so, it had experienced failures in its 
contestation attempts. 
The Orde Lama period (1959-1965) saw the expansion of the military's 
influence in the political arena. Significantly, the military began to interfere 
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extensively in areas beyond military affairs. It successfully countered Sukarno's 
moves to sideline its influence, eliminated the PKI and eventually forced Sukarno 
out of office. Military initiatives also successfully shaped foreign affairs during 
Konfrontasi. Its successes shaped the behavior of all political players, as civilian 
leaders subsequently had to factor in the military's potential reactions to political 
decisions. The frequency and scope of military prerogatives and contestations 
during Orde Lama thus illustrated a leap from those previously undertaken. 
Orde Baru (1966-1998) saw the general decline of the military's influence 
in politics, although it continued to play an important role exercising its social 
roles at the lower levels of Indonesian society. Suharto's intimate knowledge of 
the military enabled him to exercise a relatively successful "checks-and-balances" 
strategy in containing the military's political role. His continued employment of 
loyalists in key positions ensured that he maintained effective control over the 
military. By the 1990s, he had rendered the military leadership basically impotent, 
unable to counter Suharto's and Habibie's initiatives. Even the recent events 
.leading to and following the downfall of Suharto proved that the military was 
unable to exercise its prerogatives or contestations at pre-Orde Baru levels. 
In summary, the levels of military prerogatives and contestations against 
civilians are depicted in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Summary of the Levels of Military Prerogatives and Contestations 
Period Level of Military Prerogative Remarks 
and Contestation 
Pre-Orde Lama Medium-high Prerogatives and contestations conducted 
(1944-1959) mainly to assert control over military affairs. 
OrdeLama High Frequency of military prerogatives and 
(1959-1966) contestations increased. The military did not 
confine its interference to military affairs. It 
also actively sought to influence outcomes in 
both Indonesia's domestic politics as well as 
foreign affairs. 
Orde Baru High-medium The military still played a pivotal part in 
(1966-1998) Indonesia's politics. However, Suharto was 
successful in limiting the military's influence 
by 1990s. The frequency and scope of 
military interference also decreased. 
Post Orde Baru Medium? The extent of military interference in the 
downfall of Suharto is still unknown. 
The next chapter will put forward some reasons for the decline of the 
military's socio-political role in Indonesian society. The motives of Suharto-the 
main player in instigating this decline-will be examined. In addition, the 
possibility that the military would voluntarily relinquish some of its political 
initiatives exists. As Indonesia matures, it is natural that the military would want to 
retreat to the background of the socio-political arena and allow civilians take the 
lead in these areas, unless the civilians seriously threaten its basic ideals. This 
aspect will be examined. 
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IV. REASONS FOR THE DECLINING SOCIO-POLITICAL ROLE 
Chapter Ill demonstrated the fluctuations in the military's socio-political 
participation throughout the years. The military's political involvement matured 
during the Orde Lama period, resulting in extensive interventions in both 
domestic and international politics. However, this trend did not continue into 
Suharto's Orde Baru period. From its successes in the constant struggle against 
the civilian leadership during the Orde Lama period, the military's ability to 
successfully contest Suharto's initiatives saw a gradual decline in recent years. 
This chapter will put forward some of the possible reasons for the decline 
in the levels exercised by the military in the socio-political arena. There is no 
single answer that can explain the decline; rather, it is a very complex process 
that cannot be oversimplified. Several avenues will be explored, examining any 
pressures within and outside the military that are compelling the decline in these 
roles. 
A. SUHARTO'S INITIATIVES TO MARGINALIZE THE MILITARY 
Most western scholars largely ignored Suharto's manipulation of the 
military as they saw him and the military as a seamless team and his government 
as a military regime. However, this section contends that Suharto had played a 
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pivotal role in marginalizing the military in the political arena. Prior to his 
resignation in May 1998, Suharto had been largely successful in molding the 
military to meet his requirements. He treated the military in the same manner as 
other political apparatus-using the institution effectively in accordance to his 
desires, and at the same time ensuring that the military remained firmly in his 
control. Being a former army general, Suharto knew the intricacies of the 
military's organization and internal affairs. He was able to develop the skills he 
had gleaned from handling the 1965 coup and its aftermath. Specifically, he was 
able to utilize his power and resources as the military's Pangti (Panglima Tertinggi 
or Supreme Commander) to directly influence military appointments, promotions 
and developmental directions. It is not surprising that Suharto directed his 
attention at containing the military, given the fact that it was the most organized 
and competent player in Indonesia's political scene. The following section will 
present some feasible explanations for Suharto's attempts at limiting the military's 
political influence. The following are only possible reasons, as the analysis entails 
the studying of one man's mind-Suharto's-and assumes that he was a rational 
player in deciding his courses of action. 
1. The Military as a Potential Political Rival 
The successful elimination of the PKI after the 1965 coup left the military 
as the only organized body capable of mounting political challenges against the 
civilian leadership. Suharto no doubt was aware of this fact as he was one of the 
major proponents of an active political role for the military to confront Sukamo. In 
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addition, it was his skillful manipulation of the military's socio-political role that had 
initially provided him with the legitimacy to wrest the ruling powers from Sukamo. 
However, he was aware that a strong and united military could potentially become 
a significant rival to his rule if he was unsuccessful in controlling the institution. 
Thus, he could not simply strip these roles from the military, .as such an action 
would alienate the latter and possibly tum the military against him. As such, 
Suharto had to continually seek to contain the political ambitions of the military 
while at the same time allowing it to exercise its socio-political role in order to 
eliminate the institution as a potential political rival. 
2. Fear over Possible Military Coups 
Another plausible reason that could explain Suharto's decision to reduce 
the military's political influence was his fear of military coups. While the military 
leadership had always emphasized that it would never conduct a coup against a 
legitimate civilian government, the possibility was always present given the 
strength of the military and its extensive involvement in politics. As Suharto 
became increasingly authoritative in his rule and his attempts at marginalizing the 
military became more apparent in the 1990s, the risk of a military coup against 
him undoubtedly increased. Suharto therefore had to continue his efforts in 
containing the military, even courting the Muslim faction in the 1990s as a 
"balancer" against the influence of the military. 
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3. Cronyism and Nepotism 
Another possible reason for marginalizing the military could be that 
Suharto was aiming to protect his family's and friends' business interests. By the 
1980s, the business tentacles of the First Family had spread throughout the 
Indonesian economy, dabbling into the financial, investment, production and 
distribution sectors. Before the downfall of Suharto, the conglomerates formed by 
his children were among the largest in the country.107 These conglomerates 
benefited from the licenses and concessions granted to them and their 
companies by their father's govemment.108 Economists who have studied the 
family's business operations say there has rarely been even the pretense of 
competitive bidding when businesses owned by the president or his children have 
been awarded government contracts. 109 
In addition to the obvious nepotism, Suharto also had to ensure that the 
military did not interfere in the crony capitalism he was pursuing. Benefiting from 
close connections to the president, these "crony businessmen" like Liem Sioe 
107 Bimantara Citra, owned by Suharto's son Trihatmodjo, was one of Indonesia's 
largest companies, with subsidiaries in hotels, telecommunications, chemicals and food. The 
president's eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (widely known as Tutut), also built up a 
business empire with her sisters in 1983, and later with her husband. The Humpuss Group 
belonging to sons Hutomo and Sigit Ha~ojudanto also benefited from Suharto's patronage. 
108 Humpuss and Bimantara were granted concessions for the overseas distribution of 
petrochemical products manufactured by the government oil company, while Mrs. Rukmana was 
awarded the right to build toll roads through Jakarta. In the 1990s, television licenses were 
granted to both Trihatmodjo and Mrs. Rukmana. In addition, a group of investors led by 
Trihatmodjo took control of the state-owned Palapa commercial satellite network. 
109 Philip Shenon, "For the First Family of Indonesia, an Empire Now in Jeopardy," The 
New York Times, January 16, 1998, available on Internet at http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/ 
day/news/world/ accessed on 16 January 1998. 
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Liong and Mohammed "Bob" Hasan were able to build vast conglomerates, 
amassing wealth through government-granted import and trading monopolies, 
privileged access to government contracts and state bank credit, and the ability to 
bend government policies in their favor. In return, they would bankroll a good 
measure of Suharto's patronage activities and stand ready to provide emergency 
funds in crisis situations. 110 
The Indonesian military had traditionally relied on its participation in the 
economy to supplement the meager defense budgets. Through appointments in 
the various civilian corporations, the military was able to siphon off a substantial 
amount of funds for its use. In addition, the military's stretch into the economy is 
extensive, both through official foundations and enterprises as well as on the 
individual basis. 111 The First Family's and friends' business practises thus 
threatened the military's sources of revenue. The Indonesian economy, though 
large, was still a finite pie and the military in the 1980s began to find its share of 
the pie gradually diminishing as the First Family expanded into its domain. This 
110 Ibid. 
111 By appointing officers to non-military corporations such as Pertamina (the state oil 
corporation) and Bulog (National Logistics Board), the military was able to siphon off a 
substantial amount of funds for the military's usage. In addition, the military also set up various 
foundations and enterprises like Yayasan Dharma Putra Kostrad and PT Tri Usaha Bhakti which 
expanded its economic reach to the various sectors in the economy-an automobile assembling 
plant, a battery factory, clothing and shoe factories, rice mills, banks, hotels, food exporters, 
forestry projects in Kalimantan and Ambon and even airlines (Mandala, Seulawah and Zamrud 
Airlines). Individually, officers also entered the economy to improve their financial status, through 
both legitimate as well as illegitimate avenues. Often, these officers exploited their influential 
positions within the society to facilitate their economic ventures, or to obtain "commissions" from 
applicants of contracts and licenses. Here, the military leadership apparently adopted the view 
that it was perfectly natural for officers to exploit their official positions for personal gain. For a 
more detailed account, see Crouch, Army and Politics, 273-303. 
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hurt both the institution's financial position as well as the individual officer's 
income. Such developments would promote a sense of dissatisfaction among the 
military officers. Some would consider the First Family and their friends as 
benefiting at the military's expense-it was primarily the military that created the 
stable conditions for economic growth and these conglomerates were denying the 
military opportunities to benefit from its hard-earned successes. Officers used to 
enjoying a certain standard of living through extra-military economic activities 
would be enraged as opportunities for increasing their personal wealth became 
threatened. Thus, as Suharto allowed his family and friends to expand their 
commercial enterprises, he also had to forestall any resistance from the military. 
The fact that he succeeded in protecting the economic interests and that 
nepotism and cronyism prevailed extensively during Orde Baro signified his 
mastery in stifling the military's ability to contest his policies. 
4. Reduced Usefulness of the Military 
In a sense, the military was a victim of its own success. Since 1965, it had 
.effectively wiped out political opposition to the Suharto regime. As such, by the 
late 1980s, the president did not need the military as much as in the early years 
of his rule. He thus could afford to alienate the military to a certain extent without 
adversely affecting his political position. 
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5. Legitimacy in the International Arena 
During the Cold War, western countries like the United States muted their 
criticisms of military or authoritative regimes if such regimes took an anti-
Communist stance. However, the end of the Cold War saw an increase in both 
the volume and tenacity of these criticisms by both governmental and non-
governmental personalities. Being the leader of the world's fourth most populous 
nation and the largest country in Southeast Asia, Suharto would want an 
international stature befitting Indonesia's size and potential influence. He would 
not want to be viewed merely as the military leader of a third world nation. Thus, 
this desire to achieve an acceptable world status in the post-Cold War era could 
be a reason for Suharto to deliberately distance himself from the military so as to 
enhance his own legitimacy internationally. A maneuver in marginalizing the 
military politically would demonstrate to the world that his government had 
progressed beyond its formative phase and had transformed into a non-military 
regime. 
B. INTRA-MILITARY PRESSURES 
By the late 1980s, the military as an institution did not actively resist 
Suharto's initiatives in marginalizing its socio-political positions in society. The 
weak and subservient military leadership comprising mainly Suharto's loyal 
appointees, largely followed Suharto's directions without question. During Orde 
Baro, the military as an institution did not actively promote a reduction in its socio-
political involvement. It was still reaping the benefits of the system and therefore 
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had no impetus to adjust its perception of its socio-political role. It was only after 
the resignation of Suharto that military initiatives to examine and reform its socio-
political participation surfaced. Certainly, the tumultuous events of 1998-the 
push for democracy, the society's rejection of the Indonesian military's traditional 
societal roles, the military's "dirty war" against political activists112-prompted the 
military to rethink the relevancy of its socio-political rote. 
Under the new leadership of a new generation of officers like Pangab 
General Wiranto and Kassospol Lieutenant-General Bambang Yudhoyono, the 
military has openly signaled its intention to reduce its socio-political influence. 
Kassospol Yudhoyono stated that the military would "remain above" GOLKAR 
and other political parties and refrain from intervening in their activities as it had 
done in previous years. 113 Pangab Wiranto had also announced plans to separate 
the police from the military.114 Other initiatives planned include the reduction of 
military officers in other governmental ministries.115 The following section will 
112 There had been unconfirmed reports and revelations of human-rights abuses-
such as kidnapping of student activists and atrocities in Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya. In 
addition, members of the military were involved in kidnapping and killings of activists during the 1998 political upheaval, although these military personnel were apparently pursuing their own 
agenda and do not appear to have been following directions from the military headquarters. 
113 
"Abri to review its ties with Golkar and the President," The Straits Times Interactive, 
available at http://www.asia1.eom.sg/straitstimes/sea7 _0925.htm, accessed on 25 September 1998. 
114 
"Police to break away from Abri," The Straits Times Interactive, available at http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitstimes/sea9_1005.htm, accessed on 5 October 1998. 
115 
"Abri to reduce number of men in ministries," The Straits Times Interactive, 
available at http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitstimes/sea1_0904.htm, accessed on 4 September 1998. 
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proffer some reasons for these recent military moves to reduce its socio-political 
role. 
1. Maintaining Legitimacy After Orde Baru 
Evidently, the Indonesian population deeply resent the military's heavy-
handed methods in quelling social disorders during Orde Baru. Thus, it is logical 
that in the post-Suharto era, the military would seek to deflect criticisms of its past 
actions and put the blame on the policies of the old regime. This would help 
salvage whatever legitimacy it once possessed. Already, the military had admitted 
it wa~ used as a political tool by former President Suharto to further his political 
and other interests when he was in power. The military further acknowledged that 
it had exceeded its dual-function role during Orde Baru. 116 Thus, an effective 
method to achieve the above aim is to declare a re-examination of its socio-
political role and unilaterally offer to reduce its involvement in the political arena. 
This would help satisfy the population to some degree and yet allow the military to 
maintain its socio-political role in society. 
The decision to separate the police from the military structure could also 
be predicated on the military's attempts to maintain legitimacy in society. The 
police force was incorporated into the military in 1963,117 thereby allowing the 
military to have a legitimate role in ensuring the domestic security in addition to its 
116 
"Abri concedes it was tool of Suharto," The Straits Times Interactive, available at 
http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitstimes/sea5_1007.htm, accessed on 7 October 1998. 
117 Singh, Dwi Fungsi ABRI, 33. 
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external defense role. However, its oppressive methods in curbing social unrest 
through the years were less-than-welcome by the population, and its stature and 
legitimacy built up during the independence struggle gradually diminished. By 
once again reinstating the police as an independence force, any subsequent 
police actions could not be attributed to military policies. In this way, the military 
could hope to regain its legitimacy and stature in society. 
2. A Reduced Role in Democracy 
The military probably realized that its strong presence throughout all 
sectors of society had stifled the growth of effective non-governmental agencies 
and political parties. These organizations are necessary to foster healthy social 
and political environments in a truly democratic Indonesia. A responsible military 
in the post-Suharto era would therefore want to prevent repeating the same 
mistakes made during Orde Baru and not suppress the development of these 
organizations. Thus, the military leadership could have initiated the recent 
reforms to help divorce the military from direct intervention in domestic political 
affairs, thereby allowing the proper growth of political parties and non-
governmental organizations. 
3. Professionalism and Discipline 
The Indonesian military that emerged in the post-Suharto period was 
lacking both in skills and equipment to effectively confront an external military 
threat. It had to rely on decades-old war fighting doctrines developed during its 
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independence struggle against the Dutch. Thus, a retreat from non-military affairs 
would allow the military to concentrate on professional development to update 
and upgrade the military into a modern war -fighting machine. 
The Asian economic crisis of 1997 severely affected Indonesia in all 
aspects. As a result, the military suffered a reduction in the military budget. This 
lack of funds, coupled with the scaling back of bilateral training exercises as 
regional countries like Malaysia also began t9 feel the pinch of the crisis, meant 
that opportunities for professional training were also drastically reduced. Thus, 
the military would have to concentrate on professional training rather than 
expanding its socio-political role to maintain its level of professionalism. A desire 
to maintain its professionalism in this economic hardship period could therefore 
contribute to the military leadership's decision to reduce its socio-political 
involvement. 
Clearly, the present military leadership-western-trained and considered to 
be highly professional-would not condone the rampant corruption within the 
military during Orde Baro. Only a reduction in the military's socio-political 
participation, thereby reducing its influence in society and economy, could help 
re-establish some degree of discipline and decrease the levels of corruption. 
Thus, the end of Orde Baro presented an opportunity for the military leadership to 
advocate a reduction in the level of socio-political participation and to re-instill a 
sense of discipline and professionalism in the military. 
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C. OTHER DOMESTIC PRESSURES 
1. Pressures from Civil Organizations 
In spite of the relentless crackdown on errant political parties and social 
organizations during Orde Baru, certain organizations like Lembaga Bantuan 
Hukum (LBH or Legal Aid Foundation) and Human Rights Commission were 
allowed to operate in Indonesia. These organizations were instrumental in 
highlighting the human rights abuses in-country, particularly those conducted by 
the military in Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya. The exposure of these excesses 
towards the end of Orde Baru (in 1998) certainly added pressure on the military to 
consider reforming its approach towards internal security in the post-Suharto era. 
Already, the military is likely to abandon its "security approach" towards resolving 
domestic disturbances. Undoubtedly, military reforms initiated in the near future 
would seek to reduce further criticisms of its policies and actions by such 
organizations. 
2. Push from the Population 
Apart from organized non-governmental institutions, the military also faced 
mounting pressure from the population to initiate reforms. As a "people's army," 
the Indonesian military has to consider the general wishes of the people in order 
to retain its legitimacy in society. The opportunity for the military to appease the 
population arose with the resignation of Suharto. Again, this would relieve some 
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pressure off the military and at the same time allow the military to regain the 
population's trust and its stature in society. 
D. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES 
The resignation of Suharto took place in the midst of an economic crisis. 
While the extent of the military's involvement in Suharto's downfall is still unclear, 
its behavior in the post-Suharto appeared to demonstrate a certain degree of 
responsibility in handling the deteriorating political and economic situations. The 
military leadership probably realized that that international opinions are against 
military regimes like Orde Baru Indonesia. In addition, it would also assess that 
further Western financial and military aids provided to Indonesia would call for 
some degrees of political reforms. These reforms would ultimately affect the 
military's socio-political role. As such, the military could have decided to pre-empt 
such western pressures by reducing its socio-political role before being forced to 
take these reforms. This would allow the military to retain "face" domestically and 
internationally, by proclaiming that it was acting on its own initiatives. It would also 
allow the institution to better maintain its credibility in the domestic political scene. 
Here, the decision to separate the police from the military would be a 
positive step towards rehabilitating Indonesia' tarnished image. Firstly, the image 
of the Indonesian government as a military regime would be diminished, as the 
military is no longer responsible for internal security. In addition, such a move 
would also present an impression that the military was returning to its 
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professional roots. These impressions are important in improving Indonesia's 
international image, as well as the professional image of the military. In tum, it 
would facilitate Indonesia's attempts to solicit foreign financial and military aid 
during this economic crisis and beyond. 
Many people expected the Indonesia to step in decisively and seize power 
from Suharto during the tumultuous first half of 1998. The situation in Indonesia 
then was certainly chaotic with full-scale riots occurring in the major cities in the 
archipelago. However, the Indonesian military did not step in to seize direct 
power. Here, it acted responsibly and allowed the existing civilian apparatus to 
control the domestic political situation, including the change in the country's 
leadership. By not conducting a military coup but instead supporting democratic 
reforms, the military was able to maintain its credibility and its legitimacy in the 
Indonesian society in the post-Suharto era. 
The above analysis has offered some possible reasons for the reduction of 
the military's socio-political influence during Orde Baru and in the immediate 
period after Suharto's resignation. Suharto's own mandate in ensuring his rule 
and the prosperity of his family probably dictated the military's directions during 
Orde Baru. This state of events remained until the economic downturn in 1997 
and 1998, which unleashed a wave of discontent in Indonesia that Suharto could 
not suppress and ultimately leading to his resignation. A consequence of this 
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crisis also released the military from Suharto's grasp, allowing it to exercise its 
own initiatives in the post-Suharto era. Till now, the military leadership apparently 
had decided to continue with the reduction of the institution's socio-political role, 
although it had emphasized that it would not consider a total elimination of these 
roles. The possible reasons for this military's decision are listed above. The next 
section will postulate the impact on Indonesian society of such a reduction in the 
military's socio-political role. 
E. IMPACT OF THE REDUCED LEVEL OF MILITARY SOCIO-POLITICAL 
ROLE 
1. Impact on the Military 
a. A Return to Professionalism 
Since the end of Konfrontasi, the Indonesian military's attention had 
been deflected away from the development of a modern fighting force designed to 
combat external threats. Thus, a reduced role in the socio-political arena would 
allow the military to focus its attention on the professional aspects of soldiering. 
The abilities to effective contain and repulse external military threats would 
enhance the security of Indonesia and would also contribute to regional stability. 
In addition, the impending separation of the police from the military 
will contribute towards the development of a more professional military. By 
relieving the military of the onerous task of ensuring internal domestic stability, 
the separation would also allow the police to develop its own forces 
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independently in accordance with internationally accepted police practises. This 
would result in the development of a professional police force. 
b. Manpower Deployment 
The military would reduce the number of senior officers deployed to 
the non-military organizations, ministries and in the political system (both in the 
MPR and DPR) under the new military initiatives to limit its participation in the 
socio-political arena. This would likely create problems for the military as the 
institution had often use these non-military posts as career positions for its 
officers. In the short term, one potential problem is that the military cannot find 
enough positions to re-deploy these officers. In the long term, the military will 
have to restructure its organization to account for the reduction in deployment 
positions. While the military officers now would be at a higher risk of being made 
redundant, the organization as a whole could benefit from this excess pool of 
officers. It can now afford to choose the best officers to fill the limited number of 
posts; officers who can contribute towards increasing the level of professionalism 
within the military. 
c. Reduction in Finances 
The withdrawal of military officers from their non-military posts' 
would deny them the opportunities to obtain financial gains from these positions 
in the form of official allowances and unofficial bribes. This would create a group 
of dissatisfied senior officers whose incomes are being reduced. The morale of 
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the officer corps would likely to be negatively affected by the diminishing 
prospects of earning additional incomes. Thus, while there is apparently a desire 
to reduce the socio-political involvement, the loss of supplementary income would 
be a factor for resisting such moves. Again, this is a problem that the military 
leadership has to confront and resolve before taking concrete steps towards the 
reduction of these roles. 
2. Impact on Society 
a. A Potential Power Vacuum 
The military has been deeply involved in the Indonesian society 
since the independence struggle. The sudden withdrawal from participating in 
these roles could impact negatively on society. There will be a vacuum in the 
Indonesian society where the military has traditionally existed, for example, in 
developing backward villages through the ABRI Masuk Desa programs. Unless 
the withdrawal is gradual and other agencies are allowed to be developed to 
replace the military in these areas, this would become a major problem for the 
Indonesian population. The ensuring vacuum would likely mean that social 
developments could be stunted with the lack of direction and supervision. As 
such, a responsible military would want to limit the extent of the reduction in 
socio-political role in order to minimize the potential disturbances to society. In 
addition, it would have to assist in the development of civil institutions that could 
fulfill these social roles. The military could second personnel to such 
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organizations to help develop the necessary infrastructure as well as to impart its 
experiences in order to accelerate the learning curve. 
b. True Democracy or "Liberal Democracy?" 
The euphoria after Suharto's resignation, and the expectations of 
true democracy in Indonesia would likely result in an explosion of political parties 
in Indonesia. While this would demonstrate that democracy in the western sense 
has prevailed, it could also result in a relapse of the Indonesian political system to 
the "Liberal Democracy" environment experienced during Sukamo's era. Then, 
the multitude of political parties resulted in coalition governments that were 
ineffective in governing the country, and it was the resultant instability that 
prompted the military together with Sukamo to actively intervene in the political 
system. This is a situation that a responsible Indonesian military would seek to 
prevent, as such a climate would prove to be socially and politically destabilizing. 
As such, this concern would likely temper the level of withdrawal the military is 
contemplating in the near future. 
It was through the turbulent times of the independence struggle that the 
Indonesian military cemented its socio-political role in the society. It is again 
through social and political upheavals in 1998 that the Indonesian military is 
contemplating a change in directions with regards to these same roles. The 
discontents that led to the removal of President Suharto had initiated a desire for 
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social changes and style of governance in Indonesia. Both existing and emerging 
political players together with the educated are demanding widespread political 
changes to replace the authoritarian regime of Orde Baru, and at the same time 
threatening the military's traditional socio-political role. Pressures from the social, 
political and international sectors as well as internal desires are forcing the 
Indonesian military to reform its approaches towards these roles. This is a critical 
time for both the military and the country; a wrong calculation by the military could 





A. THE FUTURE OF THE MILITARY'S SOCIO-POLITICAL ROLE 
"The needs and aspirations of the people are growing. I think that the dual 
function needs to be readjusted. In the past we have held civilian posts. In the 
future, the number can be decreased," said Kassospol Lieutenant-General 
Bambang Yudhoyono in an interview with Asiaweek in July 1998.118 Given 
Yudhoyono's position, this view will set the tone of the military's initiatives 
concerning its socio-political role in the near future. In the following months, there 
were further statements by both prominent military and civilian leaders regarding 
this issue. However, to date, there have been no concrete plans on how the 
military would reduce its socio-political involvement in the Indonesian society until 
Pangab General Wiranto announced plans to separate the police from the military 
in October 1998. This chapter speculates on how this reduction will play out. 
1. A Reduction in Political Influence 
What does the future hold for the military in its involvement in the socio-
political arena? Politically, the military is likely to fulfill its promise to reform its 
approach to political interference. However, it is unlikely to totally abandon its 
exercise of these functions and "return to the barracks." Instead, it will still retain 
118 Quoted in Jose Manuel Tesoro, "A Matter of Force," Asiaweek Online 3 July 1998, 
available at http://www. pathfinder.corn/asiaweek/98/0703/nat_ 8_indomilitary. html, accessed on 
13 October 1998. 
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some influence on Indonesia's political stage, although it is likely to refrain from 
exerting direct influence on the directions of political developments or hinder the 
formation of political parties in the same fashion as in Orde Baru. This may take 
the form of a reduced presence in the political apparatus, for example, a 
reduction in the number of allocated seats both in the DPR and the MPR as well 
as in the number of military officers employed in non-military positions in the 
various ministries. The military is also expected to remain above all the political 
parties, and in the process abandon its linkages with Golkar to promote greater 
democracy in Indonesia. It is also likely not interfere in normal governance and 
political interplay among the various parties, but is likely to retain its option to 
intervene in case if there were political chaos or instability. This will be in line with 
the military's duty to maintain security and stability in the country, as well as to 
prevent a repeat of the debacle of the "Liberal Democracy" phase of the 1950s. 
2. Status Quo in its Social Roles 
In the social arena, the military in the near future is likely to maintain its 
prominence. This is mainly due to the fact that there are presently no established 
governmental and non-governmental organizations capable of replacing the 
military in these roles. This situation is likely to persist until the present economic 
crisis eases and when the government can provide sufficient funds for such 
organizations. Even so, the military is unlikely to relinquish these social roles, as 
its origins were closely tied to the Indonesian people. Thus, any development of 
non-military organizations is likely to supplement the military in conducting social 
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duties, rather than replacing it. Towards this end, the military through its think-
tank Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional (Lemhanas or National Defense Institute) 
has initiated dialogues with pro-democracy and human rights non-governmental 
organizations even before the fall of Suharto. 119 These efforts wiil undoubtedly 
continue into the future. 
At present, Pangab General Wiranto appeared to be instrumental in 
charting the new directions for the military. Under his leadership, the military had 
announced some initiatives to reduce its involvement in domestic politics. He has 
publicly announced that the military would implement reforms to its socio-political 
participation by 1999. So far, he has appeared to be supportive of pro-democracy 
reforms in Indonesia. With like-minded senior military officers such as Kassospo/ 
lieutenant-General Bambang Yudhoyono, Wiranto would have the power, the 
. resources and support to pursue these military reforms. 
Habibie is widely seen as a product of the Suharto era, being a minister in 
Suharto's cabinet as well as a close confidant to the former president. As such, 
his position as president in this new era is always under pressure and scrutiny, 
especially when he did not have a strong support base when he became 
president. Habibie therefore has little choice but to champion pro-democracy 
reforms in order to maintain his position and to win grassroots support for himself. 
119 A one-day seminar on "Strengthening People's Participation for the Formation of 
Civil Society in Indonesia" was organized by the military on 22 September 1997. The discussions 
can be found in Menuju Masyarakat Madani (Jakarta: PT Penebar Swadaya, 1998). 
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This situation will continue at least until elections in 1999, after which the political 
situation in Indonesia will become relatively clear. 
B. CONCLUSION 
This thesis adapted Alfred Stepan's analysis of the levels of military 
prerogatives and contestations employed by the military towards the civilian 
authorities in its analysis. 120 This model proved to be well suited in the analysis of 
the Indonesian military's involvement in the socio-political sphere, providing a 
balanced road map in looking at significant events both objectively and 
subjectively. As such, it is the writer's opinion that this method could be adapted 
effectively to analyze other civil-military relations. 
This thesis has traced the development of the Indonesian military's socio-
political role through the decades. It has demonstrated that these roles had their 
roots in the independence struggle against the Dutch, and the military would find 
it difficult to relinquish these roles without a strong extra-military impetus. It has 
also proved the thesis that the Indonesian military's socio-political role was in a 
state of decline since Suharto came into power in 1966, with the decline most 
significant since the late 1980s. Possible reasons are also presented, notably the 
role played by former president Suharto. 
An understanding of the circumstances leading to the crystallization and 
decline of the Indonesian military's socio-political role provides a better insight 
120 See Chapter I for a detailed description of the methodology. 
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into Indonesia's extremely dynamic political situation. The coming years will be 
crucial in the formation of Indonesia's new political landscape, and the military's 
initiatives in this area will have a definitive effect on the development. Even with 
the implementation of more democratic reforms, the military will still likely 
maintain a stake in the new system. This is to ensure the stability of the social 
and political situation domestically, as well as to safeguard its own interests. 
The Indonesian military will remain engaged in the socio-political arena in 
the near future. Without its mitigating influence, there is a possibility that 
Indonesia will revert to the chaotic times of the 1950s. Growth of the backward 
regions of the archipelago will also be severely hindered if the military does not 
participate in social programs in these areas. In the medium to long term, the 
situation may change with the maturing of the democratic movements and the 
establishment of non-military social organizations. Then, the military can 
concentrate its attention on developing a professional armed force befitting its 
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